diff options
| author | Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de> | 2021-06-05 18:21:57 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de> | 2021-06-06 17:49:40 +0200 |
| commit | 04a260911ca0f10a0e37c487c220e1aae3623dda (patch) | |
| tree | 1c061dbdfea12c58743d088bf20937d2abc0f605 /package/kernel | |
| parent | 3c46ba053d899df65dc07e373c64d1925d30f88e (diff) | |
| download | upstream-04a260911ca0f10a0e37c487c220e1aae3623dda.tar.gz upstream-04a260911ca0f10a0e37c487c220e1aae3623dda.tar.bz2 upstream-04a260911ca0f10a0e37c487c220e1aae3623dda.zip | |
mac80211: Update to backports-5.10.42
The removed patches were integrated upstream.
The brcmf_driver_work workqueue was removed in brcmfmac with kernel
5.10.42, the asynchronous call was covered to a synchronous call. There
is no need to wait any more.
This part was removed manually from this patch:
brcm/860-brcmfmac-register-wiphy-s-during-module_init.patch
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'package/kernel')
34 files changed, 63 insertions, 2349 deletions
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/Makefile b/package/kernel/mac80211/Makefile index 92167ebf3b..a8a84f843a 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/Makefile +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/Makefile @@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/kernel.mk PKG_NAME:=mac80211 -PKG_VERSION:=5.10.34-1 +PKG_VERSION:=5.10.42-1 PKG_RELEASE:=1 -PKG_SOURCE_URL:=@KERNEL/linux/kernel/projects/backports/stable/v5.10.34/ -PKG_HASH:=03c4ca6bf47d4e50b91b61bc2943a98c788439e56ce2b4080bc4c94141c2c15b +PKG_SOURCE_URL:=@KERNEL/linux/kernel/projects/backports/stable/v5.10.42/ +PKG_HASH:=6876520105240844fdb32d1dcdf2bfdea291a37a96f16c892fda3776ba714fcb PKG_SOURCE:=backports-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.xz PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(KERNEL_BUILD_DIR)/backports-$(PKG_VERSION) diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/402-ath_regd_optional.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/402-ath_regd_optional.patch index 3c9180b113..bf87d3551a 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/402-ath_regd_optional.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath/402-ath_regd_optional.patch @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ help --- a/local-symbols +++ b/local-symbols -@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ ADM8211= +@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ ADM8211= ATH_COMMON= WLAN_VENDOR_ATH= ATH_DEBUG= diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/080-ath10k_thermal_config.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/080-ath10k_thermal_config.patch index 55d48daa79..d183419a47 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/080-ath10k_thermal_config.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/080-ath10k_thermal_config.patch @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ void ath10k_thermal_event_temperature(struct ath10k *ar, int temperature); --- a/local-symbols +++ b/local-symbols -@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ ATH10K_SNOC= +@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ ATH10K_SNOC= ATH10K_DEBUG= ATH10K_DEBUGFS= ATH10K_SPECTRAL= diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/300-ath10k-add-CCMP-PN-replay-protection-for-fragmented-.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/300-ath10k-add-CCMP-PN-replay-protection-for-fragmented-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0ce49b22ab..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/300-ath10k-add-CCMP-PN-replay-protection-for-fragmented-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,180 +0,0 @@ -From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org> -Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:52 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: add CCMP PN replay protection for fragmented - frames for PCIe - -PN replay check for not fragmented frames is finished in the firmware, -but this was not done for fragmented frames when ath10k is used with -QCA6174/QCA6377 PCIe. mac80211 has the function -ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() for PN replay check for fragmented frames, -but this does not get checked with QCA6174 due to the -ieee80211_has_protected() condition not matching the cleared Protected -bit case. - -Validate the PN of received fragmented frames within ath10k when CCMP is -used and drop the fragment if the PN is not correct (incremented by -exactly one from the previous fragment). This applies only for -QCA6174/QCA6377 PCIe. - -Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1 - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org> -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> ---- - ---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h -+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt.h -@@ -846,6 +846,7 @@ enum htt_security_types { - - #define ATH10K_HTT_TXRX_PEER_SECURITY_MAX 2 - #define ATH10K_TXRX_NUM_EXT_TIDS 19 -+#define ATH10K_TXRX_NON_QOS_TID 16 - - enum htt_security_flags { - #define HTT_SECURITY_TYPE_MASK 0x7F ---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c -@@ -1746,16 +1746,87 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload - msdu->ip_summed = ath10k_htt_rx_get_csum_state(msdu); - } - -+static u64 ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(struct ath10k *ar, struct sk_buff *skb, -+ u16 offset, -+ enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype) -+{ -+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; -+ u64 pn = 0; -+ u8 *ehdr; -+ -+ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset); -+ ehdr = skb->data + offset + ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); -+ -+ if (enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2) { -+ pn = ehdr[0]; -+ pn |= (u64)ehdr[1] << 8; -+ pn |= (u64)ehdr[4] << 16; -+ pn |= (u64)ehdr[5] << 24; -+ pn |= (u64)ehdr[6] << 32; -+ pn |= (u64)ehdr[7] << 40; -+ } -+ return pn; -+} -+ -+static bool ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(struct ath10k *ar, -+ struct sk_buff *skb, -+ u16 peer_id, -+ u16 offset, -+ enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype) -+{ -+ struct ath10k_peer *peer; -+ union htt_rx_pn_t *last_pn, new_pn = {0}; -+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; -+ bool more_frags; -+ u8 tid, frag_number; -+ u32 seq; -+ -+ peer = ath10k_peer_find_by_id(ar, peer_id); -+ if (!peer) { -+ ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_HTT, "invalid peer for frag pn check\n"); -+ return false; -+ } -+ -+ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset); -+ if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) -+ tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr); -+ else -+ tid = ATH10K_TXRX_NON_QOS_TID; -+ -+ last_pn = &peer->frag_tids_last_pn[tid]; -+ new_pn.pn48 = ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(ar, skb, offset, enctype); -+ more_frags = ieee80211_has_morefrags(hdr->frame_control); -+ frag_number = le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl) & IEEE80211_SCTL_FRAG; -+ seq = (__le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl) & IEEE80211_SCTL_SEQ) >> 4; -+ -+ if (frag_number == 0) { -+ last_pn->pn48 = new_pn.pn48; -+ peer->frag_tids_seq[tid] = seq; -+ } else { -+ if (seq != peer->frag_tids_seq[tid]) -+ return false; -+ -+ if (new_pn.pn48 != last_pn->pn48 + 1) -+ return false; -+ -+ last_pn->pn48 = new_pn.pn48; -+ } -+ -+ return true; -+} -+ - static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct ath10k *ar, - struct sk_buff_head *amsdu, - struct ieee80211_rx_status *status, - bool fill_crypt_header, - u8 *rx_hdr, -- enum ath10k_pkt_rx_err *err) -+ enum ath10k_pkt_rx_err *err, -+ u16 peer_id, -+ bool frag) - { - struct sk_buff *first; - struct sk_buff *last; -- struct sk_buff *msdu; -+ struct sk_buff *msdu, *temp; - struct htt_rx_desc *rxd; - struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; - enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype; -@@ -1768,6 +1839,7 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct - bool is_decrypted; - bool is_mgmt; - u32 attention; -+ bool frag_pn_check = true; - - if (skb_queue_empty(amsdu)) - return; -@@ -1866,6 +1938,24 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct - } - - skb_queue_walk(amsdu, msdu) { -+ if (frag && !fill_crypt_header && is_decrypted && -+ enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_AES_CCM_WPA2) -+ frag_pn_check = ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(ar, -+ msdu, -+ peer_id, -+ 0, -+ enctype); -+ -+ if (!frag_pn_check) { -+ /* Discard the fragment with invalid PN */ -+ temp = msdu->prev; -+ __skb_unlink(msdu, amsdu); -+ dev_kfree_skb_any(msdu); -+ msdu = temp; -+ frag_pn_check = true; -+ continue; -+ } -+ - ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload(msdu); - ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap(ar, msdu, status, first_hdr, enctype, - is_decrypted); -@@ -2071,7 +2161,8 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_handle_amsdu(st - ath10k_htt_rx_h_unchain(ar, &amsdu, &drop_cnt, &unchain_cnt); - - ath10k_htt_rx_h_filter(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, &drop_cnt_filter); -- ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, true, first_hdr, &err); -+ ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, rx_status, true, first_hdr, &err, 0, -+ false); - msdus_to_queue = skb_queue_len(&amsdu); - ath10k_htt_rx_h_enqueue(ar, &amsdu, rx_status); - -@@ -3027,7 +3118,7 @@ static int ath10k_htt_rx_in_ord_ind(stru - ath10k_htt_rx_h_ppdu(ar, &amsdu, status, vdev_id); - ath10k_htt_rx_h_filter(ar, &amsdu, status, NULL); - ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(ar, &amsdu, status, false, NULL, -- NULL); -+ NULL, peer_id, frag); - ath10k_htt_rx_h_enqueue(ar, &amsdu, status); - break; - case -EAGAIN: diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/301-ath10k-drop-fragments-with-multicast-DA-for-PCIe.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/301-ath10k-drop-fragments-with-multicast-DA-for-PCIe.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7288c66612..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/301-ath10k-drop-fragments-with-multicast-DA-for-PCIe.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,66 +0,0 @@ -From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org> -Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:53 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: drop fragments with multicast DA for PCIe - -Fragmentation is not used with multicast frames. Discard unexpected -fragments with multicast DA. This fixes CVE-2020-26145. - -Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1 - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org> -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> ---- - ---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c -@@ -1768,6 +1768,16 @@ static u64 ath10k_htt_rx_h_get_pn(struct - return pn; - } - -+static bool ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_multicast_check(struct ath10k *ar, -+ struct sk_buff *skb, -+ u16 offset) -+{ -+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; -+ -+ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)(skb->data + offset); -+ return !is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1); -+} -+ - static bool ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_pn_check(struct ath10k *ar, - struct sk_buff *skb, - u16 peer_id, -@@ -1839,7 +1849,7 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct - bool is_decrypted; - bool is_mgmt; - u32 attention; -- bool frag_pn_check = true; -+ bool frag_pn_check = true, multicast_check = true; - - if (skb_queue_empty(amsdu)) - return; -@@ -1946,13 +1956,20 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct - 0, - enctype); - -- if (!frag_pn_check) { -- /* Discard the fragment with invalid PN */ -+ if (frag) -+ multicast_check = ath10k_htt_rx_h_frag_multicast_check(ar, -+ msdu, -+ 0); -+ -+ if (!frag_pn_check || !multicast_check) { -+ /* Discard the fragment with invalid PN or multicast DA -+ */ - temp = msdu->prev; - __skb_unlink(msdu, amsdu); - dev_kfree_skb_any(msdu); - msdu = temp; - frag_pn_check = true; -+ multicast_check = true; - continue; - } - diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/302-ath10k-drop-fragments-with-multicast-DA-for-SDIO.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/302-ath10k-drop-fragments-with-multicast-DA-for-SDIO.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 85d9ce65e2..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/302-ath10k-drop-fragments-with-multicast-DA-for-SDIO.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,40 +0,0 @@ -From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org> -Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:54 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: drop fragments with multicast DA for SDIO - -Fragmentation is not used with multicast frames. Discard unexpected -fragments with multicast DA. This fixes CVE-2020-26145. - -Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 SDIO WLAN.RMH.4.4.1-00049 - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org> -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> ---- - ---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c -@@ -2617,6 +2617,13 @@ static bool ath10k_htt_rx_proc_rx_frag_i - rx_desc = (struct htt_hl_rx_desc *)(skb->data + tot_hdr_len); - rx_desc_info = __le32_to_cpu(rx_desc->info); - -+ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)((u8 *)rx_desc + rx_hl->fw_desc.len); -+ -+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) { -+ /* Discard the fragment with multicast DA */ -+ goto err; -+ } -+ - if (!MS(rx_desc_info, HTT_RX_DESC_HL_INFO_ENCRYPTED)) { - spin_unlock_bh(&ar->data_lock); - return ath10k_htt_rx_proc_rx_ind_hl(htt, &resp->rx_ind_hl, skb, -@@ -2624,8 +2631,6 @@ static bool ath10k_htt_rx_proc_rx_frag_i - HTT_RX_NON_TKIP_MIC); - } - -- hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)((u8 *)rx_desc + rx_hl->fw_desc.len); -- - if (ieee80211_has_retry(hdr->frame_control)) - goto err; - diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/303-ath10k-drop-MPDU-which-has-discard-flag-set-by-firmw.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/303-ath10k-drop-MPDU-which-has-discard-flag-set-by-firmw.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 03bce4231b..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/303-ath10k-drop-MPDU-which-has-discard-flag-set-by-firmw.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org> -Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:55 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: drop MPDU which has discard flag set by firmware - for SDIO - -When the discard flag is set by the firmware for an MPDU, it should be -dropped. This allows a mitigation for CVE-2020-24588 to be implemented -in the firmware. - -Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 SDIO WLAN.RMH.4.4.1-00049 - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org> -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> ---- - ---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c -@@ -2312,6 +2312,11 @@ static bool ath10k_htt_rx_proc_rx_ind_hl - fw_desc = &rx->fw_desc; - rx_desc_len = fw_desc->len; - -+ if (fw_desc->u.bits.discard) { -+ ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_HTT, "htt discard mpdu\n"); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ - /* I have not yet seen any case where num_mpdu_ranges > 1. - * qcacld does not seem handle that case either, so we introduce the - * same limitiation here as well. ---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/rx_desc.h -+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/rx_desc.h -@@ -1282,7 +1282,19 @@ struct fw_rx_desc_base { - #define FW_RX_DESC_UDP (1 << 6) - - struct fw_rx_desc_hl { -- u8 info0; -+ union { -+ struct { -+ u8 discard:1, -+ forward:1, -+ any_err:1, -+ dup_err:1, -+ reserved:1, -+ inspect:1, -+ extension:2; -+ } bits; -+ u8 info0; -+ } u; -+ - u8 version; - u8 len; - u8 flags; diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/304-ath10k-Fix-TKIP-Michael-MIC-verification-for-PCIe.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/304-ath10k-Fix-TKIP-Michael-MIC-verification-for-PCIe.patch deleted file mode 100644 index da9d6802bd..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/304-ath10k-Fix-TKIP-Michael-MIC-verification-for-PCIe.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org> -Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:56 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: Fix TKIP Michael MIC verification for PCIe - -TKIP Michael MIC was not verified properly for PCIe cases since the -validation steps in ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify() in mac80211 did -not get fully executed due to unexpected flag values in -ieee80211_rx_status. - -Fix this by setting the flags property to meet mac80211 expectations for -performing Michael MIC validation there. This fixes CVE-2020-26141. It -does the same as ath10k_htt_rx_proc_rx_ind_hl() for SDIO which passed -MIC verification case. This applies only to QCA6174/QCA9377 PCIe. - -Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1 - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org> -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> ---- - ---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c -@@ -1974,6 +1974,11 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct - } - - ath10k_htt_rx_h_csum_offload(msdu); -+ -+ if (frag && !fill_crypt_header && -+ enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_TKIP_WPA) -+ status->flag &= ~RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED; -+ - ath10k_htt_rx_h_undecap(ar, msdu, status, first_hdr, enctype, - is_decrypted); - -@@ -1991,6 +1996,11 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_mpdu(struct - - hdr = (void *)msdu->data; - hdr->frame_control &= ~__cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED); -+ -+ if (frag && !fill_crypt_header && -+ enctype == HTT_RX_MPDU_ENCRYPT_TKIP_WPA) -+ status->flag &= ~RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED & -+ ~RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED; - } - } - diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/305-ath10k-Validate-first-subframe-of-A-MSDU-before-proc.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/305-ath10k-Validate-first-subframe-of-A-MSDU-before-proc.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0bdbed78d5..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/305-ath10k-Validate-first-subframe-of-A-MSDU-before-proc.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,109 +0,0 @@ -From: Sriram R <srirrama@codeaurora.org> -Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:57 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] ath10k: Validate first subframe of A-MSDU before - processing the list - -In certain scenarios a normal MSDU can be received as an A-MSDU when -the A-MSDU present bit of a QoS header gets flipped during reception. -Since this bit is unauthenticated, the hardware crypto engine can pass -the frame to the driver without any error indication. - -This could result in processing unintended subframes collected in the -A-MSDU list. Hence, validate A-MSDU list by checking if the first frame -has a valid subframe header. - -Comparing the non-aggregated MSDU and an A-MSDU, the fields of the first -subframe DA matches the LLC/SNAP header fields of a normal MSDU. -In order to avoid processing such frames, add a validation to -filter such A-MSDU frames where the first subframe header DA matches -with the LLC/SNAP header pattern. - -Tested-on: QCA9984 hw1.0 PCI 10.4-3.10-00047 - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Sriram R <srirrama@codeaurora.org> -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> ---- - ---- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c -@@ -2108,14 +2108,62 @@ static void ath10k_htt_rx_h_unchain(stru - ath10k_unchain_msdu(amsdu, unchain_cnt); - } - -+static bool ath10k_htt_rx_validate_amsdu(struct ath10k *ar, -+ struct sk_buff_head *amsdu) -+{ -+ u8 *subframe_hdr; -+ struct sk_buff *first; -+ bool is_first, is_last; -+ struct htt_rx_desc *rxd; -+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; -+ size_t hdr_len, crypto_len; -+ enum htt_rx_mpdu_encrypt_type enctype; -+ int bytes_aligned = ar->hw_params.decap_align_bytes; -+ -+ first = skb_peek(amsdu); -+ -+ rxd = (void *)first->data - sizeof(*rxd); -+ hdr = (void *)rxd->rx_hdr_status; -+ -+ is_first = !!(rxd->msdu_end.common.info0 & -+ __cpu_to_le32(RX_MSDU_END_INFO0_FIRST_MSDU)); -+ is_last = !!(rxd->msdu_end.common.info0 & -+ __cpu_to_le32(RX_MSDU_END_INFO0_LAST_MSDU)); -+ -+ /* Return in case of non-aggregated msdu */ -+ if (is_first && is_last) -+ return true; -+ -+ /* First msdu flag is not set for the first msdu of the list */ -+ if (!is_first) -+ return false; -+ -+ enctype = MS(__le32_to_cpu(rxd->mpdu_start.info0), -+ RX_MPDU_START_INFO0_ENCRYPT_TYPE); -+ -+ hdr_len = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); -+ crypto_len = ath10k_htt_rx_crypto_param_len(ar, enctype); -+ -+ subframe_hdr = (u8 *)hdr + round_up(hdr_len, bytes_aligned) + -+ crypto_len; -+ -+ /* Validate if the amsdu has a proper first subframe. -+ * There are chances a single msdu can be received as amsdu when -+ * the unauthenticated amsdu flag of a QoS header -+ * gets flipped in non-SPP AMSDU's, in such cases the first -+ * subframe has llc/snap header in place of a valid da. -+ * return false if the da matches rfc1042 pattern -+ */ -+ if (ether_addr_equal(subframe_hdr, rfc1042_header)) -+ return false; -+ -+ return true; -+} -+ - static bool ath10k_htt_rx_amsdu_allowed(struct ath10k *ar, - struct sk_buff_head *amsdu, - struct ieee80211_rx_status *rx_status) - { -- /* FIXME: It might be a good idea to do some fuzzy-testing to drop -- * invalid/dangerous frames. -- */ -- - if (!rx_status->freq) { - ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_HTT, "no channel configured; ignoring frame(s)!\n"); - return false; -@@ -2126,6 +2174,11 @@ static bool ath10k_htt_rx_amsdu_allowed( - return false; - } - -+ if (!ath10k_htt_rx_validate_amsdu(ar, amsdu)) { -+ ath10k_dbg(ar, ATH10K_DBG_HTT, "invalid amsdu received\n"); -+ return false; -+ } -+ - return true; - } - diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/974-ath10k_add-LED-and-GPIO-controlling-support-for-various-chipsets.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/974-ath10k_add-LED-and-GPIO-controlling-support-for-various-chipsets.patch index 5e74687826..ce8effe3c3 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/974-ath10k_add-LED-and-GPIO-controlling-support-for-various-chipsets.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath10k/974-ath10k_add-LED-and-GPIO-controlling-support-for-various-chipsets.patch @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ v13: ath10k_core-$(CONFIG_DEV_COREDUMP) += coredump.o --- a/local-symbols +++ b/local-symbols -@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ ATH10K_DEBUG= +@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ ATH10K_DEBUG= ATH10K_DEBUGFS= ATH10K_SPECTRAL= ATH10K_THERMAL= @@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ v13: { --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi-tlv.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi-tlv.c -@@ -4591,6 +4591,8 @@ static const struct wmi_ops wmi_tlv_ops +@@ -4594,6 +4594,8 @@ static const struct wmi_ops wmi_tlv_ops .gen_echo = ath10k_wmi_tlv_op_gen_echo, .gen_vdev_spectral_conf = ath10k_wmi_tlv_op_gen_vdev_spectral_conf, .gen_vdev_spectral_enable = ath10k_wmi_tlv_op_gen_vdev_spectral_enable, diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath9k/551-ath9k_ubnt_uap_plus_hsr.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath9k/551-ath9k_ubnt_uap_plus_hsr.patch index cd2bdbf1a0..acb9ad443c 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath9k/551-ath9k_ubnt_uap_plus_hsr.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/ath9k/551-ath9k_ubnt_uap_plus_hsr.patch @@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ --- a/local-symbols +++ b/local-symbols -@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ ATH9K_WOW= +@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ ATH9K_WOW= ATH9K_RFKILL= ATH9K_CHANNEL_CONTEXT= ATH9K_PCOEM= diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/brcm/860-brcmfmac-register-wiphy-s-during-module_init.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/brcm/860-brcmfmac-register-wiphy-s-during-module_init.patch index dc2295db1b..c9730e29fd 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/brcm/860-brcmfmac-register-wiphy-s-during-module_init.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/brcm/860-brcmfmac-register-wiphy-s-during-module_init.patch @@ -11,16 +11,6 @@ module loads successfully. Signed-off-by: RafaÅ‚ MiÅ‚ecki <zajec5@gmail.com> --- ---- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/core.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/core.c -@@ -1557,6 +1557,7 @@ int __init brcmf_core_init(void) - { - if (!schedule_work(&brcmf_driver_work)) - return -EBUSY; -+ flush_work(&brcmf_driver_work); - - return 0; - } --- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c @@ -431,6 +431,7 @@ struct brcmf_fw { diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/build/001-fix_build.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/build/001-fix_build.patch index e57ca190e4..8f63d36e2e 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/build/001-fix_build.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/build/001-fix_build.patch @@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ - echo "" ;\ - done \ - ) > Kconfig.kernel ;\ -- kver=$$($(MAKE) --no-print-directory -C $(KLIB_BUILD) kernelversion | \ -- sed 's/^\(\([3-5]\|2\.6\)\.[0-9]\+\).*/\1/;t;d') ;\ +- kver=$$($(MAKE) --no-print-directory -C $(KLIB_BUILD) M=$(BACKPORT_DIR) \ +- kernelversion | sed 's/^\(\([3-5]\|2\.6\)\.[0-9]\+\).*/\1/;t;d');\ - test "$$kver" != "" || echo "Kernel version parse failed!" ;\ - test "$$kver" != "" ;\ - kvers="$$(seq 14 39 | sed 's/^/2.6./')" ;\ @@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ + @echo " done." + +Kconfig.versions: Kconfig.kernel -+ @kver=$$($(MAKE) --no-print-directory -C $(KLIB_BUILD) kernelversion | \ -+ sed 's/^\(\([3-5]\|2\.6\)\.[0-9]\+\).*/\1/;t;d') ;\ ++ @kver=$$($(MAKE) --no-print-directory -C $(KLIB_BUILD) M=$(BACKPORT_DIR) \ ++ kernelversion | sed 's/^\(\([3-5]\|2\.6\)\.[0-9]\+\).*/\1/;t;d');\ + test "$$kver" != "" || echo "Kernel version parse failed!" ;\ + test "$$kver" != "" ;\ + kvers="$$(seq 14 39 | sed 's/^/2.6./')" ;\ diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/mwl/700-mwl8k-missing-pci-id-for-WNR854T.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/mwl/700-mwl8k-missing-pci-id-for-WNR854T.patch index cfa40e1bd2..d358cfe367 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/mwl/700-mwl8k-missing-pci-id-for-WNR854T.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/mwl/700-mwl8k-missing-pci-id-for-WNR854T.patch @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwl8k.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwl8k.c -@@ -5694,6 +5694,7 @@ MODULE_FIRMWARE("mwl8k/fmimage_8366.fw") +@@ -5695,6 +5695,7 @@ MODULE_FIRMWARE("mwl8k/fmimage_8366.fw") MODULE_FIRMWARE(MWL8K_8366_AP_FW(MWL8K_8366_AP_FW_API)); static const struct pci_device_id mwl8k_pci_id_table[] = { diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/mwl/940-mwl8k_init_devices_synchronously.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/mwl/940-mwl8k_init_devices_synchronously.patch index f3130f7ae7..a35cf1875a 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/mwl/940-mwl8k_init_devices_synchronously.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/mwl/940-mwl8k_init_devices_synchronously.patch @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwl8k.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwl8k.c -@@ -6279,6 +6279,8 @@ static int mwl8k_probe(struct pci_dev *p +@@ -6280,6 +6280,8 @@ static int mwl8k_probe(struct pci_dev *p priv->running_bsses = 0; @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ return rc; err_stop_firmware: -@@ -6312,8 +6314,6 @@ static void mwl8k_remove(struct pci_dev +@@ -6313,8 +6315,6 @@ static void mwl8k_remove(struct pci_dev return; priv = hw->priv; diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/rt2x00/602-rt2x00-introduce-rt2x00eeprom.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/rt2x00/602-rt2x00-introduce-rt2x00eeprom.patch index 1c52132da6..e74d9a9aa0 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/rt2x00/602-rt2x00-introduce-rt2x00eeprom.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/rt2x00/602-rt2x00-introduce-rt2x00eeprom.patch @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- a/local-symbols +++ b/local-symbols -@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ RT2X00_LIB_FIRMWARE= +@@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ RT2X00_LIB_FIRMWARE= RT2X00_LIB_CRYPTO= RT2X00_LIB_LEDS= RT2X00_LIB_DEBUGFS= diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/rtl/001-v5.12-rtlwifi-8821ae-upgrade-PHY-and-RF-parameters.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/rtl/001-v5.12-rtlwifi-8821ae-upgrade-PHY-and-RF-parameters.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7b6cd99d82..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/rtl/001-v5.12-rtlwifi-8821ae-upgrade-PHY-and-RF-parameters.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,817 +0,0 @@ -From 8f392a72419c4b10e84e635e51bee24670975364 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com> -Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2021 13:26:07 +0800 -Subject: [PATCH] rtlwifi: 8821ae: upgrade PHY and RF parameters - -New parameters with new format and its parser are updated by the -commit 84d26fda52e2 ("rtlwifi: Update 8821ae new phy parameters and its parser."), -but some parameters are missing. Use this commit to update to the novel -parameters that use new format. - -Fixes: 84d26fda52e2 ("rtlwifi: Update 8821ae new phy parameters and its parser") -Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com> -Tested-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> ---- - .../realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/table.c | 500 +++++++++++++----- - 1 file changed, 370 insertions(+), 130 deletions(-) - ---- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/table.c -+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/table.c -@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_PHY_REG_ARRAY[] = { - 0x824, 0x00030FE0, - 0x828, 0x00000000, - 0x82C, 0x002081DD, -- 0x830, 0x2AAA8E24, -+ 0x830, 0x2AAAEEC8, - 0x834, 0x0037A706, - 0x838, 0x06489B44, - 0x83C, 0x0000095B, -@@ -324,10 +324,10 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_PHY_REG_ARRAY[] = { - 0x9D8, 0x00000000, - 0x9DC, 0x00000000, - 0x9E0, 0x00005D00, -- 0x9E4, 0x00000002, -+ 0x9E4, 0x00000003, - 0x9E8, 0x00000001, - 0xA00, 0x00D047C8, -- 0xA04, 0x01FF000C, -+ 0xA04, 0x01FF800C, - 0xA08, 0x8C8A8300, - 0xA0C, 0x2E68000F, - 0xA10, 0x9500BB78, -@@ -1320,7 +1320,11 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x083, 0x00021800, - 0x084, 0x00028000, - 0x085, 0x00048000, -+ 0x80000111, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x086, 0x0009483A, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x086, 0x00094838, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x087, 0x00044980, - 0x088, 0x00048000, - 0x089, 0x0000D480, -@@ -1409,36 +1413,32 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x03C, 0x000CA000, - 0x0EF, 0x00000000, - 0x0EF, 0x00001100, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xABCD, -+ 0x80000111, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x0004ADF3, - 0x034, 0x00049DF0, -- 0xFF0F0204, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000110, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x0004ADF3, - 0x034, 0x00049DF0, -- 0xFF0F0404, 0xCDEF, -- 0x034, 0x0004ADF3, -- 0x034, 0x00049DF0, -- 0xFF0F0200, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000210, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x0004ADF5, - 0x034, 0x00049DF2, -- 0xFF0F02C0, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x9000020c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x034, 0x0004A0F3, -+ 0x034, 0x000490B1, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x0004A0F3, - 0x034, 0x000490B1, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0x90000200, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x034, 0x0004ADF5, -+ 0x034, 0x00049DF2, -+ 0x90000410, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x034, 0x0004ADF3, -+ 0x034, 0x00049DF0, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x0004ADF7, - 0x034, 0x00049DF3, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xDEAD, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xABCD, -- 0x034, 0x00048DED, -- 0x034, 0x00047DEA, -- 0x034, 0x00046DE7, -- 0x034, 0x00045CE9, -- 0x034, 0x00044CE6, -- 0x034, 0x000438C6, -- 0x034, 0x00042886, -- 0x034, 0x00041486, -- 0x034, 0x00040447, -- 0xFF0F0204, 0xCDEF, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x80000111, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x00048DED, - 0x034, 0x00047DEA, - 0x034, 0x00046DE7, -@@ -1448,7 +1448,7 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x034, 0x00042886, - 0x034, 0x00041486, - 0x034, 0x00040447, -- 0xFF0F0404, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000110, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x00048DED, - 0x034, 0x00047DEA, - 0x034, 0x00046DE7, -@@ -1458,7 +1458,17 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x034, 0x00042886, - 0x034, 0x00041486, - 0x034, 0x00040447, -- 0xFF0F02C0, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x9000020c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x034, 0x000480AE, -+ 0x034, 0x000470AB, -+ 0x034, 0x0004608B, -+ 0x034, 0x00045069, -+ 0x034, 0x00044048, -+ 0x034, 0x00043045, -+ 0x034, 0x00042026, -+ 0x034, 0x00041023, -+ 0x034, 0x00040002, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x000480AE, - 0x034, 0x000470AB, - 0x034, 0x0004608B, -@@ -1468,7 +1478,17 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x034, 0x00042026, - 0x034, 0x00041023, - 0x034, 0x00040002, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0x90000410, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x034, 0x00048DED, -+ 0x034, 0x00047DEA, -+ 0x034, 0x00046DE7, -+ 0x034, 0x00045CE9, -+ 0x034, 0x00044CE6, -+ 0x034, 0x000438C6, -+ 0x034, 0x00042886, -+ 0x034, 0x00041486, -+ 0x034, 0x00040447, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x00048DEF, - 0x034, 0x00047DEC, - 0x034, 0x00046DE9, -@@ -1478,38 +1498,36 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x034, 0x0004248A, - 0x034, 0x0004108D, - 0x034, 0x0004008A, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xDEAD, -- 0xFF0F0200, 0xABCD, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x80000210, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x0002ADF4, -- 0xFF0F02C0, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x9000020c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x034, 0x0002A0F3, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x0002A0F3, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0x90000200, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x034, 0x0002ADF4, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x0002ADF7, -- 0xFF0F0200, 0xDEAD, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xABCD, -- 0x034, 0x00029DF4, -- 0xFF0F0204, 0xCDEF, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x80000111, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x00029DF4, -- 0xFF0F0404, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000110, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x00029DF4, -- 0xFF0F0200, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000210, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x00029DF1, -- 0xFF0F02C0, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x9000020c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x034, 0x000290F0, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x000290F0, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0x90000200, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x034, 0x00029DF1, -+ 0x90000410, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x034, 0x00029DF4, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x00029DF2, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xDEAD, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xABCD, -- 0x034, 0x00028DF1, -- 0x034, 0x00027DEE, -- 0x034, 0x00026DEB, -- 0x034, 0x00025CEC, -- 0x034, 0x00024CE9, -- 0x034, 0x000238CA, -- 0x034, 0x00022889, -- 0x034, 0x00021489, -- 0x034, 0x0002044A, -- 0xFF0F0204, 0xCDEF, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x80000111, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x00028DF1, - 0x034, 0x00027DEE, - 0x034, 0x00026DEB, -@@ -1519,7 +1537,7 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x034, 0x00022889, - 0x034, 0x00021489, - 0x034, 0x0002044A, -- 0xFF0F0404, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000110, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x00028DF1, - 0x034, 0x00027DEE, - 0x034, 0x00026DEB, -@@ -1529,7 +1547,7 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x034, 0x00022889, - 0x034, 0x00021489, - 0x034, 0x0002044A, -- 0xFF0F02C0, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x9000020c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x000280AF, - 0x034, 0x000270AC, - 0x034, 0x0002608B, -@@ -1539,7 +1557,27 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x034, 0x00022026, - 0x034, 0x00021023, - 0x034, 0x00020002, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x034, 0x000280AF, -+ 0x034, 0x000270AC, -+ 0x034, 0x0002608B, -+ 0x034, 0x00025069, -+ 0x034, 0x00024048, -+ 0x034, 0x00023045, -+ 0x034, 0x00022026, -+ 0x034, 0x00021023, -+ 0x034, 0x00020002, -+ 0x90000410, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x034, 0x00028DF1, -+ 0x034, 0x00027DEE, -+ 0x034, 0x00026DEB, -+ 0x034, 0x00025CEC, -+ 0x034, 0x00024CE9, -+ 0x034, 0x000238CA, -+ 0x034, 0x00022889, -+ 0x034, 0x00021489, -+ 0x034, 0x0002044A, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x00028DEE, - 0x034, 0x00027DEB, - 0x034, 0x00026CCD, -@@ -1549,27 +1587,24 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x034, 0x00022849, - 0x034, 0x00021449, - 0x034, 0x0002004D, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xDEAD, -- 0xFF0F02C0, 0xABCD, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x8000020c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x034, 0x0000A0D7, -+ 0x034, 0x000090D3, -+ 0x034, 0x000080B1, -+ 0x034, 0x000070AE, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x0000A0D7, - 0x034, 0x000090D3, - 0x034, 0x000080B1, - 0x034, 0x000070AE, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x0000ADF7, - 0x034, 0x00009DF4, - 0x034, 0x00008DF1, - 0x034, 0x00007DEE, -- 0xFF0F02C0, 0xDEAD, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xABCD, -- 0x034, 0x00006DEB, -- 0x034, 0x00005CEC, -- 0x034, 0x00004CE9, -- 0x034, 0x000038CA, -- 0x034, 0x00002889, -- 0x034, 0x00001489, -- 0x034, 0x0000044A, -- 0xFF0F0204, 0xCDEF, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x80000111, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x00006DEB, - 0x034, 0x00005CEC, - 0x034, 0x00004CE9, -@@ -1577,7 +1612,7 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x034, 0x00002889, - 0x034, 0x00001489, - 0x034, 0x0000044A, -- 0xFF0F0404, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000110, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x00006DEB, - 0x034, 0x00005CEC, - 0x034, 0x00004CE9, -@@ -1585,7 +1620,7 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x034, 0x00002889, - 0x034, 0x00001489, - 0x034, 0x0000044A, -- 0xFF0F02C0, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x9000020c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x0000608D, - 0x034, 0x0000506B, - 0x034, 0x0000404A, -@@ -1593,7 +1628,23 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x034, 0x00002044, - 0x034, 0x00001025, - 0x034, 0x00000004, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x034, 0x0000608D, -+ 0x034, 0x0000506B, -+ 0x034, 0x0000404A, -+ 0x034, 0x00003047, -+ 0x034, 0x00002044, -+ 0x034, 0x00001025, -+ 0x034, 0x00000004, -+ 0x90000410, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x034, 0x00006DEB, -+ 0x034, 0x00005CEC, -+ 0x034, 0x00004CE9, -+ 0x034, 0x000038CA, -+ 0x034, 0x00002889, -+ 0x034, 0x00001489, -+ 0x034, 0x0000044A, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x034, 0x00006DCD, - 0x034, 0x00005CCD, - 0x034, 0x00004CCA, -@@ -1601,11 +1652,11 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x034, 0x00002888, - 0x034, 0x00001488, - 0x034, 0x00000486, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xDEAD, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x0EF, 0x00000000, - 0x018, 0x0001712A, - 0x0EF, 0x00000040, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xABCD, -+ 0x80000111, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x035, 0x00000187, - 0x035, 0x00008187, - 0x035, 0x00010187, -@@ -1615,7 +1666,7 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x035, 0x00040188, - 0x035, 0x00048188, - 0x035, 0x00050188, -- 0xFF0F0204, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000110, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x035, 0x00000187, - 0x035, 0x00008187, - 0x035, 0x00010187, -@@ -1625,7 +1676,37 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x035, 0x00040188, - 0x035, 0x00048188, - 0x035, 0x00050188, -- 0xFF0F0404, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000210, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x035, 0x00000128, -+ 0x035, 0x00008128, -+ 0x035, 0x00010128, -+ 0x035, 0x000201C8, -+ 0x035, 0x000281C8, -+ 0x035, 0x000301C8, -+ 0x035, 0x000401C8, -+ 0x035, 0x000481C8, -+ 0x035, 0x000501C8, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x035, 0x00000145, -+ 0x035, 0x00008145, -+ 0x035, 0x00010145, -+ 0x035, 0x00020196, -+ 0x035, 0x00028196, -+ 0x035, 0x00030196, -+ 0x035, 0x000401C7, -+ 0x035, 0x000481C7, -+ 0x035, 0x000501C7, -+ 0x90000200, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x035, 0x00000128, -+ 0x035, 0x00008128, -+ 0x035, 0x00010128, -+ 0x035, 0x000201C8, -+ 0x035, 0x000281C8, -+ 0x035, 0x000301C8, -+ 0x035, 0x000401C8, -+ 0x035, 0x000481C8, -+ 0x035, 0x000501C8, -+ 0x90000410, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x035, 0x00000187, - 0x035, 0x00008187, - 0x035, 0x00010187, -@@ -1635,7 +1716,7 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x035, 0x00040188, - 0x035, 0x00048188, - 0x035, 0x00050188, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x035, 0x00000145, - 0x035, 0x00008145, - 0x035, 0x00010145, -@@ -1645,11 +1726,11 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x035, 0x000401C7, - 0x035, 0x000481C7, - 0x035, 0x000501C7, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xDEAD, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x0EF, 0x00000000, - 0x018, 0x0001712A, - 0x0EF, 0x00000010, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xABCD, -+ 0x80000111, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x036, 0x00085733, - 0x036, 0x0008D733, - 0x036, 0x00095733, -@@ -1662,7 +1743,7 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x036, 0x000CE4B4, - 0x036, 0x000D64B4, - 0x036, 0x000DE4B4, -- 0xFF0F0204, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000110, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x036, 0x00085733, - 0x036, 0x0008D733, - 0x036, 0x00095733, -@@ -1675,7 +1756,46 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x036, 0x000CE4B4, - 0x036, 0x000D64B4, - 0x036, 0x000DE4B4, -- 0xFF0F0404, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000210, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x036, 0x000063B5, -+ 0x036, 0x0000E3B5, -+ 0x036, 0x000163B5, -+ 0x036, 0x0001E3B5, -+ 0x036, 0x000263B5, -+ 0x036, 0x0002E3B5, -+ 0x036, 0x000363B5, -+ 0x036, 0x0003E3B5, -+ 0x036, 0x000463B5, -+ 0x036, 0x0004E3B5, -+ 0x036, 0x000563B5, -+ 0x036, 0x0005E3B5, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x036, 0x000056B3, -+ 0x036, 0x0000D6B3, -+ 0x036, 0x000156B3, -+ 0x036, 0x0001D6B3, -+ 0x036, 0x00026634, -+ 0x036, 0x0002E634, -+ 0x036, 0x00036634, -+ 0x036, 0x0003E634, -+ 0x036, 0x000467B4, -+ 0x036, 0x0004E7B4, -+ 0x036, 0x000567B4, -+ 0x036, 0x0005E7B4, -+ 0x90000200, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x036, 0x000063B5, -+ 0x036, 0x0000E3B5, -+ 0x036, 0x000163B5, -+ 0x036, 0x0001E3B5, -+ 0x036, 0x000263B5, -+ 0x036, 0x0002E3B5, -+ 0x036, 0x000363B5, -+ 0x036, 0x0003E3B5, -+ 0x036, 0x000463B5, -+ 0x036, 0x0004E3B5, -+ 0x036, 0x000563B5, -+ 0x036, 0x0005E3B5, -+ 0x90000410, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x036, 0x00085733, - 0x036, 0x0008D733, - 0x036, 0x00095733, -@@ -1688,7 +1808,7 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x036, 0x000CE4B4, - 0x036, 0x000D64B4, - 0x036, 0x000DE4B4, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x036, 0x000056B3, - 0x036, 0x0000D6B3, - 0x036, 0x000156B3, -@@ -1701,103 +1821,162 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x036, 0x0004E7B4, - 0x036, 0x000567B4, - 0x036, 0x0005E7B4, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xDEAD, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x0EF, 0x00000000, - 0x0EF, 0x00000008, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xABCD, -+ 0x80000111, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x03C, 0x000001C8, - 0x03C, 0x00000492, -- 0xFF0F0204, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000110, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x03C, 0x000001C8, - 0x03C, 0x00000492, -- 0xFF0F0404, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000210, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x03C, 0x000001B6, -+ 0x03C, 0x00000492, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x03C, 0x0000022A, -+ 0x03C, 0x00000594, -+ 0x90000200, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x03C, 0x000001B6, -+ 0x03C, 0x00000492, -+ 0x90000410, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x03C, 0x000001C8, - 0x03C, 0x00000492, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x03C, 0x0000022A, - 0x03C, 0x00000594, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xDEAD, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xABCD, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x80000111, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x03C, 0x00000800, -- 0xFF0F0204, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000110, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x03C, 0x00000800, -- 0xFF0F0404, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000210, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x03C, 0x00000800, -- 0xFF0F02C0, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x9000020c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x03C, 0x00000820, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x03C, 0x00000820, -+ 0x90000200, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x03C, 0x00000800, -+ 0x90000410, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x03C, 0x00000800, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x03C, 0x00000900, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xDEAD, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x0EF, 0x00000000, - 0x018, 0x0001712A, - 0x0EF, 0x00000002, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xABCD, -+ 0x80000111, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x008, 0x0004E400, -- 0xFF0F0204, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000110, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x008, 0x0004E400, -- 0xFF0F0404, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000210, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x008, 0x00002000, -+ 0x9000020c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x008, 0x00002000, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x008, 0x00002000, -+ 0x90000200, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x008, 0x00002000, -+ 0x90000410, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x008, 0x0004E400, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x008, 0x00002000, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xDEAD, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x0EF, 0x00000000, - 0x0DF, 0x000000C0, -- 0x01F, 0x00040064, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xABCD, -+ 0x01F, 0x00000064, -+ 0x80000111, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x058, 0x000A7284, - 0x059, 0x000600EC, -- 0xFF0F0204, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000110, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x058, 0x000A7284, - 0x059, 0x000600EC, -- 0xFF0F0404, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x9000020c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x058, 0x00081184, -+ 0x059, 0x0006016C, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x058, 0x00081184, -+ 0x059, 0x0006016C, -+ 0x90000200, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x058, 0x00081184, -+ 0x059, 0x0006016C, -+ 0x90000410, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x058, 0x000A7284, - 0x059, 0x000600EC, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x058, 0x00081184, - 0x059, 0x0006016C, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xDEAD, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xABCD, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x80000111, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x061, 0x000E8D73, - 0x062, 0x00093FC5, -- 0xFF0F0204, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000110, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x061, 0x000E8D73, - 0x062, 0x00093FC5, -- 0xFF0F0404, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000210, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x061, 0x000EFD83, -+ 0x062, 0x00093FCC, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x061, 0x000EAD53, -+ 0x062, 0x00093BC4, -+ 0x90000200, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x061, 0x000EFD83, -+ 0x062, 0x00093FCC, -+ 0x90000410, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x061, 0x000E8D73, - 0x062, 0x00093FC5, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x061, 0x000EAD53, - 0x062, 0x00093BC4, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xDEAD, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xABCD, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x80000111, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x063, 0x000110E9, -- 0xFF0F0204, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000110, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x063, 0x000110E9, -- 0xFF0F0404, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000210, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x063, 0x000110EB, -+ 0x9000020c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x063, 0x000110E9, -- 0xFF0F0200, 0xCDEF, -- 0x063, 0x000710E9, -- 0xFF0F02C0, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x063, 0x000110E9, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0x90000200, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x063, 0x000110EB, -+ 0x90000410, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x063, 0x000110E9, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x063, 0x000714E9, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xDEAD, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xABCD, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x80000111, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x064, 0x0001C27C, -+ 0x90000110, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x064, 0x0001C27C, -+ 0x90000210, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x064, 0x0001C27C, -- 0xFF0F0204, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x064, 0x0001C67C, -+ 0x90000200, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x064, 0x0001C27C, -- 0xFF0F0404, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x90000410, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x064, 0x0001C27C, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x064, 0x0001C67C, -- 0xFF0F0104, 0xDEAD, -- 0xFF0F0200, 0xABCD, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x80000111, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x065, 0x00091016, -+ 0x90000110, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x065, 0x00091016, -+ 0x90000210, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x065, 0x00093016, -- 0xFF0F02C0, 0xCDEF, -+ 0x9000020c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x065, 0x00093015, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x065, 0x00093015, -+ 0x90000200, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x065, 0x00093016, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x065, 0x00091016, -- 0xFF0F0200, 0xDEAD, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x018, 0x00000006, - 0x0EF, 0x00002000, - 0x03B, 0x0003824B, -@@ -1895,9 +2074,10 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_RADIOA_ARRAY[] = { - 0x0B4, 0x0001214C, - 0x0B7, 0x0003000C, - 0x01C, 0x000539D2, -+ 0x0C4, 0x000AFE00, - 0x018, 0x0001F12A, -- 0x0FE, 0x00000000, -- 0x0FE, 0x00000000, -+ 0xFFE, 0x00000000, -+ 0xFFE, 0x00000000, - 0x018, 0x0001712A, - - }; -@@ -2017,6 +2197,7 @@ u32 RTL8812AE_MAC_REG_ARRAY[] = { - u32 RTL8812AE_MAC_1T_ARRAYLEN = ARRAY_SIZE(RTL8812AE_MAC_REG_ARRAY); - - u32 RTL8821AE_MAC_REG_ARRAY[] = { -+ 0x421, 0x0000000F, - 0x428, 0x0000000A, - 0x429, 0x00000010, - 0x430, 0x00000000, -@@ -2485,7 +2666,7 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_AGC_TAB_ARRAY[] = { - 0x81C, 0xA6360001, - 0x81C, 0xA5380001, - 0x81C, 0xA43A0001, -- 0x81C, 0xA33C0001, -+ 0x81C, 0x683C0001, - 0x81C, 0x673E0001, - 0x81C, 0x66400001, - 0x81C, 0x65420001, -@@ -2519,7 +2700,66 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_AGC_TAB_ARRAY[] = { - 0x81C, 0x017A0001, - 0x81C, 0x017C0001, - 0x81C, 0x017E0001, -- 0xFF0F02C0, 0xABCD, -+ 0x8000020c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, -+ 0x81C, 0xFB000101, -+ 0x81C, 0xFA020101, -+ 0x81C, 0xF9040101, -+ 0x81C, 0xF8060101, -+ 0x81C, 0xF7080101, -+ 0x81C, 0xF60A0101, -+ 0x81C, 0xF50C0101, -+ 0x81C, 0xF40E0101, -+ 0x81C, 0xF3100101, -+ 0x81C, 0xF2120101, -+ 0x81C, 0xF1140101, -+ 0x81C, 0xF0160101, -+ 0x81C, 0xEF180101, -+ 0x81C, 0xEE1A0101, -+ 0x81C, 0xED1C0101, -+ 0x81C, 0xEC1E0101, -+ 0x81C, 0xEB200101, -+ 0x81C, 0xEA220101, -+ 0x81C, 0xE9240101, -+ 0x81C, 0xE8260101, -+ 0x81C, 0xE7280101, -+ 0x81C, 0xE62A0101, -+ 0x81C, 0xE52C0101, -+ 0x81C, 0xE42E0101, -+ 0x81C, 0xE3300101, -+ 0x81C, 0xA5320101, -+ 0x81C, 0xA4340101, -+ 0x81C, 0xA3360101, -+ 0x81C, 0x87380101, -+ 0x81C, 0x863A0101, -+ 0x81C, 0x853C0101, -+ 0x81C, 0x843E0101, -+ 0x81C, 0x69400101, -+ 0x81C, 0x68420101, -+ 0x81C, 0x67440101, -+ 0x81C, 0x66460101, -+ 0x81C, 0x49480101, -+ 0x81C, 0x484A0101, -+ 0x81C, 0x474C0101, -+ 0x81C, 0x2A4E0101, -+ 0x81C, 0x29500101, -+ 0x81C, 0x28520101, -+ 0x81C, 0x27540101, -+ 0x81C, 0x26560101, -+ 0x81C, 0x25580101, -+ 0x81C, 0x245A0101, -+ 0x81C, 0x235C0101, -+ 0x81C, 0x055E0101, -+ 0x81C, 0x04600101, -+ 0x81C, 0x03620101, -+ 0x81C, 0x02640101, -+ 0x81C, 0x01660101, -+ 0x81C, 0x01680101, -+ 0x81C, 0x016A0101, -+ 0x81C, 0x016C0101, -+ 0x81C, 0x016E0101, -+ 0x81C, 0x01700101, -+ 0x81C, 0x01720101, -+ 0x9000040c, 0x00000000, 0x40000000, 0x00000000, - 0x81C, 0xFB000101, - 0x81C, 0xFA020101, - 0x81C, 0xF9040101, -@@ -2578,7 +2818,7 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_AGC_TAB_ARRAY[] = { - 0x81C, 0x016E0101, - 0x81C, 0x01700101, - 0x81C, 0x01720101, -- 0xCDCDCDCD, 0xCDCD, -+ 0xA0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x81C, 0xFF000101, - 0x81C, 0xFF020101, - 0x81C, 0xFE040101, -@@ -2637,7 +2877,7 @@ u32 RTL8821AE_AGC_TAB_ARRAY[] = { - 0x81C, 0x046E0101, - 0x81C, 0x03700101, - 0x81C, 0x02720101, -- 0xFF0F02C0, 0xDEAD, -+ 0xB0000000, 0x00000000, - 0x81C, 0x01740101, - 0x81C, 0x01760101, - 0x81C, 0x01780101, diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch index ec6ecbcfce..ca02dfb06f 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ #endif /* AES_GCM_H */ --- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c -@@ -311,7 +311,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee +@@ -312,7 +312,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee } @@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ { __le16 mask_fc; int a4_included, mgmt; -@@ -341,14 +342,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s +@@ -342,14 +343,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s else qos_tid = 0; @@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7) -@@ -356,6 +351,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s +@@ -357,6 +352,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4); memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); @@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */ -@@ -412,7 +409,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8 +@@ -413,7 +410,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8 u8 *pos; u8 pn[6]; u64 pn64; @@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; if (info->control.hw_key && -@@ -467,9 +464,11 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8 +@@ -468,9 +465,11 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8 return 0; pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ } -@@ -542,13 +541,13 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee +@@ -543,13 +542,13 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ @@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } -@@ -643,7 +642,7 @@ static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8 +@@ -646,7 +645,7 @@ static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8 u8 *pos; u8 pn[6]; u64 pn64; @@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; if (info->control.hw_key && -@@ -700,8 +699,10 @@ static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8 +@@ -703,8 +702,10 @@ static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8 pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN; gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad); @@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ } ieee80211_tx_result -@@ -1128,9 +1129,9 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct +@@ -1133,9 +1134,9 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; @@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1)) return TX_DROP; -@@ -1176,7 +1177,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct +@@ -1181,7 +1182,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/150-disable_addr_notifier.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/150-disable_addr_notifier.patch index 9589235f71..8d086625e4 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/150-disable_addr_notifier.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/150-disable_addr_notifier.patch @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ static int ieee80211_ifa6_changed(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long data, void *arg) { -@@ -1312,14 +1312,14 @@ int ieee80211_register_hw(struct ieee802 +@@ -1315,14 +1315,14 @@ int ieee80211_register_hw(struct ieee802 rtnl_unlock(); @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ local->ifa6_notifier.notifier_call = ieee80211_ifa6_changed; result = register_inet6addr_notifier(&local->ifa6_notifier); if (result) -@@ -1328,13 +1328,13 @@ int ieee80211_register_hw(struct ieee802 +@@ -1331,13 +1331,13 @@ int ieee80211_register_hw(struct ieee802 return 0; @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ fail_ifa: #endif wiphy_unregister(local->hw.wiphy); -@@ -1362,10 +1362,10 @@ void ieee80211_unregister_hw(struct ieee +@@ -1365,10 +1365,10 @@ void ieee80211_unregister_hw(struct ieee tasklet_kill(&local->tx_pending_tasklet); tasklet_kill(&local->tasklet); diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/300-cfg80211-support-immediate-reconnect-request-hint.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/300-cfg80211-support-immediate-reconnect-request-hint.patch index 807d496080..8fe8723cfe 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/300-cfg80211-support-immediate-reconnect-request-hint.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/300-cfg80211-support-immediate-reconnect-request-hint.patch @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> * cfg80211_rx_unprot_mlme_mgmt - notification of unprotected mlme mgmt frame --- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c -@@ -2729,7 +2729,7 @@ static void ieee80211_report_disconnect( +@@ -2734,7 +2734,7 @@ static void ieee80211_report_disconnect( }; if (tx) @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> else cfg80211_rx_mlme_mgmt(sdata->dev, buf, len); -@@ -4719,7 +4719,8 @@ void ieee80211_mgd_quiesce(struct ieee80 +@@ -4724,7 +4724,8 @@ void ieee80211_mgd_quiesce(struct ieee80 if (ifmgd->auth_data) ieee80211_destroy_auth_data(sdata, false); cfg80211_tx_mlme_mgmt(sdata->dev, frame_buf, diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/301-mac80211-support-driver-based-disconnect-with-reconn.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/301-mac80211-support-driver-based-disconnect-with-reconn.patch index 59a154a543..31621ebf11 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/301-mac80211-support-driver-based-disconnect-with-reconn.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/301-mac80211-support-driver-based-disconnect-with-reconn.patch @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> * @vif: &struct ieee80211_vif pointer from the add_interface callback. --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h -@@ -461,7 +461,9 @@ struct ieee80211_if_managed { +@@ -450,7 +450,9 @@ struct ieee80211_if_managed { unsigned long probe_timeout; int probe_send_count; bool nullfunc_failed; @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> struct ieee80211_mgd_auth_data *auth_data; --- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c -@@ -2720,7 +2720,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_ap_probereq_get) +@@ -2725,7 +2725,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_ap_probereq_get) static void ieee80211_report_disconnect(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, const u8 *buf, size_t len, bool tx, @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> { struct ieee80211_event event = { .type = MLME_EVENT, -@@ -2729,7 +2729,7 @@ static void ieee80211_report_disconnect( +@@ -2734,7 +2734,7 @@ static void ieee80211_report_disconnect( }; if (tx) @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> else cfg80211_rx_mlme_mgmt(sdata->dev, buf, len); -@@ -2751,13 +2751,18 @@ static void __ieee80211_disconnect(struc +@@ -2756,13 +2756,18 @@ static void __ieee80211_disconnect(struc tx = !sdata->csa_block_tx; @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> tx, frame_buf); mutex_lock(&local->mtx); sdata->vif.csa_active = false; -@@ -2770,7 +2775,9 @@ static void __ieee80211_disconnect(struc +@@ -2775,7 +2780,9 @@ static void __ieee80211_disconnect(struc mutex_unlock(&local->mtx); ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, frame_buf, sizeof(frame_buf), tx, @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> sdata_unlock(sdata); } -@@ -2789,6 +2796,13 @@ static void ieee80211_beacon_connection_ +@@ -2794,6 +2801,13 @@ static void ieee80211_beacon_connection_ sdata_info(sdata, "Connection to AP %pM lost\n", ifmgd->bssid); __ieee80211_disconnect(sdata); @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> } else { ieee80211_mgd_probe_ap(sdata, true); } -@@ -2827,6 +2841,21 @@ void ieee80211_connection_loss(struct ie +@@ -2832,6 +2846,21 @@ void ieee80211_connection_loss(struct ie } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_connection_loss); @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> static void ieee80211_destroy_auth_data(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, bool assoc) -@@ -3130,7 +3159,7 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_deauth(str +@@ -3135,7 +3164,7 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_deauth(str ieee80211_set_disassoc(sdata, 0, 0, false, NULL); ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, (u8 *)mgmt, len, false, @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> return; } -@@ -3179,7 +3208,8 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_disassoc(s +@@ -3184,7 +3213,8 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_disassoc(s ieee80211_set_disassoc(sdata, 0, 0, false, NULL); @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> } static void ieee80211_get_rates(struct ieee80211_supported_band *sband, -@@ -4199,7 +4229,8 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_beacon(str +@@ -4204,7 +4234,8 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_beacon(str true, deauth_buf); ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, deauth_buf, sizeof(deauth_buf), true, @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> return; } -@@ -4344,7 +4375,7 @@ static void ieee80211_sta_connection_los +@@ -4349,7 +4380,7 @@ static void ieee80211_sta_connection_los tx, frame_buf); ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, frame_buf, sizeof(frame_buf), true, @@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> } static int ieee80211_auth(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) -@@ -5434,7 +5465,8 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_auth(struct ieee80211_ +@@ -5439,7 +5470,8 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_auth(struct ieee80211_ ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, frame_buf, sizeof(frame_buf), true, @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> } sdata_info(sdata, "authenticate with %pM\n", req->bss->bssid); -@@ -5506,7 +5538,8 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_assoc(struct ieee80211 +@@ -5511,7 +5543,8 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_assoc(struct ieee80211 ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, frame_buf, sizeof(frame_buf), true, @@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> } if (ifmgd->auth_data && !ifmgd->auth_data->done) { -@@ -5805,7 +5838,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_deauth(struct ieee8021 +@@ -5810,7 +5843,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_deauth(struct ieee8021 ieee80211_destroy_auth_data(sdata, false); ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, frame_buf, sizeof(frame_buf), true, @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> return 0; } -@@ -5825,7 +5858,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_deauth(struct ieee8021 +@@ -5830,7 +5863,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_deauth(struct ieee8021 ieee80211_destroy_assoc_data(sdata, false, true); ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, frame_buf, sizeof(frame_buf), true, @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> return 0; } -@@ -5840,7 +5873,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_deauth(struct ieee8021 +@@ -5845,7 +5878,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_deauth(struct ieee8021 req->reason_code, tx, frame_buf); ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, frame_buf, sizeof(frame_buf), true, @@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> return 0; } -@@ -5873,7 +5906,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_disassoc(struct ieee80 +@@ -5878,7 +5911,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_disassoc(struct ieee80 frame_buf); ieee80211_report_disconnect(sdata, frame_buf, sizeof(frame_buf), true, diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/311-net-fq_impl-drop-get_default_func-move-default-flow-.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/311-net-fq_impl-drop-get_default_func-move-default-flow-.patch index f8748ef123..33dbb5eb90 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/311-net-fq_impl-drop-get_default_func-move-default-flow-.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/311-net-fq_impl-drop-get_default_func-move-default-flow-.patch @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> static int fq_init(struct fq *fq, int flows_cnt) --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h -@@ -857,7 +857,6 @@ enum txq_info_flags { +@@ -846,7 +846,6 @@ enum txq_info_flags { */ struct txq_info { struct fq_tin tin; diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/315-mac80211-add-rx-decapsulation-offload-support.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/315-mac80211-add-rx-decapsulation-offload-support.patch index 09407f3b1d..b8bb2930f5 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/315-mac80211-add-rx-decapsulation-offload-support.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/315-mac80211-add-rx-decapsulation-offload-support.patch @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> #endif /* __MAC80211_DRIVER_OPS */ --- a/net/mac80211/iface.c +++ b/net/mac80211/iface.c -@@ -839,7 +839,7 @@ static const struct net_device_ops ieee8 +@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ static const struct net_device_ops ieee8 }; @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> { switch (iftype) { /* P2P GO and client are mapped to AP/STATION types */ -@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ static bool ieee80211_set_sdata_offload_ +@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ static bool ieee80211_set_sdata_offload_ flags = sdata->vif.offload_flags; if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, SUPPORTS_TX_ENCAP_OFFLOAD) && @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> flags |= IEEE80211_OFFLOAD_ENCAP_ENABLED; if (!ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, SUPPORTS_TX_FRAG) && -@@ -872,10 +872,21 @@ static bool ieee80211_set_sdata_offload_ +@@ -868,10 +868,21 @@ static bool ieee80211_set_sdata_offload_ flags &= ~IEEE80211_OFFLOAD_ENCAP_ENABLED; } @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> return true; } -@@ -893,7 +904,7 @@ static void ieee80211_set_vif_encap_ops( +@@ -889,7 +900,7 @@ static void ieee80211_set_vif_encap_ops( } if (!ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, SUPPORTS_TX_ENCAP_OFFLOAD) || @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> enabled = bss->vif.offload_flags & IEEE80211_OFFLOAD_ENCAP_ENABLED; --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c -@@ -4114,7 +4114,9 @@ void ieee80211_check_fast_rx(struct sta_ +@@ -4198,7 +4198,9 @@ void ieee80211_check_fast_rx(struct sta_ .vif_type = sdata->vif.type, .control_port_protocol = sdata->control_port_protocol, }, *old, *new = NULL; @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> /* use sparse to check that we don't return without updating */ __acquire(check_fast_rx); -@@ -4227,6 +4229,17 @@ void ieee80211_check_fast_rx(struct sta_ +@@ -4311,6 +4313,17 @@ void ieee80211_check_fast_rx(struct sta_ if (assign) new = kmemdup(&fastrx, sizeof(fastrx), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> spin_lock_bh(&sta->lock); old = rcu_dereference_protected(sta->fast_rx, true); rcu_assign_pointer(sta->fast_rx, new); -@@ -4273,6 +4286,108 @@ void ieee80211_check_fast_rx_iface(struc +@@ -4357,6 +4370,108 @@ void ieee80211_check_fast_rx_iface(struc mutex_unlock(&local->sta_mtx); } @@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, struct ieee80211_fast_rx *fast_rx) { -@@ -4293,9 +4408,6 @@ static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(str +@@ -4377,9 +4492,6 @@ static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(str } addrs __aligned(2); struct ieee80211_sta_rx_stats *stats = &sta->rx_stats; @@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> /* for parallel-rx, we need to have DUP_VALIDATED, otherwise we write * to a common data structure; drivers can implement that per queue * but we don't have that information in mac80211 -@@ -4369,32 +4481,6 @@ static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(str +@@ -4453,32 +4565,6 @@ static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(str pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - fast_rx->icv_len)) goto drop; @@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> if (rx->key && !ieee80211_has_protected(hdr->frame_control)) goto drop; -@@ -4406,12 +4492,6 @@ static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(str +@@ -4490,12 +4576,6 @@ static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(str return true; } @@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> /* do the header conversion - first grab the addresses */ ether_addr_copy(addrs.da, skb->data + fast_rx->da_offs); ether_addr_copy(addrs.sa, skb->data + fast_rx->sa_offs); -@@ -4420,62 +4500,14 @@ static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(str +@@ -4504,62 +4584,14 @@ static bool ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx(str /* push the addresses in front */ memcpy(skb_push(skb, sizeof(addrs)), &addrs, sizeof(addrs)); @@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> stats->dropped++; return true; } -@@ -4529,6 +4561,47 @@ static bool ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_han +@@ -4613,6 +4645,47 @@ static bool ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_han return true; } @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> /* * This is the actual Rx frames handler. as it belongs to Rx path it must * be called with rcu_read_lock protection. -@@ -4766,15 +4839,20 @@ void ieee80211_rx_list(struct ieee80211_ +@@ -4850,15 +4923,20 @@ void ieee80211_rx_list(struct ieee80211_ * if it was previously present. * Also, frames with less than 16 bytes are dropped. */ diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/373-mac80211-support-Rx-timestamp-calculation-for-all-pr.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/373-mac80211-support-Rx-timestamp-calculation-for-all-pr.patch index c432d77b2e..117fb35fcf 100644 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/373-mac80211-support-Rx-timestamp-calculation-for-all-pr.patch +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/373-mac80211-support-Rx-timestamp-calculation-for-all-pr.patch @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h -@@ -1600,13 +1600,8 @@ ieee80211_have_rx_timestamp(struct ieee8 +@@ -1587,13 +1587,8 @@ ieee80211_have_rx_timestamp(struct ieee8 { WARN_ON_ONCE(status->flag & RX_FLAG_MACTIME_START && status->flag & RX_FLAG_MACTIME_END); diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/380-mac80211-assure-all-fragments-are-encrypted.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/380-mac80211-assure-all-fragments-are-encrypted.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 69398459f1..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/380-mac80211-assure-all-fragments-are-encrypted.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,69 +0,0 @@ -From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be> -Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:42 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: assure all fragments are encrypted - -Do not mix plaintext and encrypted fragments in protected Wi-Fi -networks. This fixes CVE-2020-26147. - -Previously, an attacker was able to first forward a legitimate encrypted -fragment towards a victim, followed by a plaintext fragment. The -encrypted and plaintext fragment would then be reassembled. For further -details see Section 6.3 and Appendix D in the paper "Fragment and Forge: -Breaking Wi-Fi Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation". - -Because of this change there are now two equivalent conditions in the -code to determine if a received fragment requires sequential PNs, so we -also move this test to a separate function to make the code easier to -maintain. - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be> -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> ---- - ---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c -+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c -@@ -2204,6 +2204,16 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee802 - return NULL; - } - -+static bool requires_sequential_pn(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, __le16 fc) -+{ -+ return rx->key && -+ (rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP || -+ rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 || -+ rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP || -+ rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256) && -+ ieee80211_has_protected(fc); -+} -+ - static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline - ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) - { -@@ -2248,12 +2258,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802 - /* This is the first fragment of a new frame. */ - entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(rx->sdata, frag, seq, - rx->seqno_idx, &(rx->skb)); -- if (rx->key && -- (rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP || -- rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 || -- rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP || -- rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256) && -- ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) { -+ if (requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc)) { - int queue = rx->security_idx; - - /* Store CCMP/GCMP PN so that we can verify that the -@@ -2295,11 +2300,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802 - u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN], *rpn; - int queue; - -- if (!rx->key || -- (rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP && -- rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 && -- rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP && -- rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256)) -+ if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc)) - return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; - memcpy(pn, entry->last_pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); - for (i = IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) { diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/381-mac80211-prevent-mixed-key-and-fragment-cache-attack.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/381-mac80211-prevent-mixed-key-and-fragment-cache-attack.patch deleted file mode 100644 index de0f89a5b0..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/381-mac80211-prevent-mixed-key-and-fragment-cache-attack.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,87 +0,0 @@ -From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be> -Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:43 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks - -Simultaneously prevent mixed key attacks (CVE-2020-24587) and fragment -cache attacks (CVE-2020-24586). This is accomplished by assigning a -unique color to every key (per interface) and using this to track which -key was used to decrypt a fragment. When reassembling frames, it is -now checked whether all fragments were decrypted using the same key. - -To assure that fragment cache attacks are also prevented, the ID that is -assigned to keys is unique even over (re)associations and (re)connects. -This means fragments separated by a (re)association or (re)connect will -not be reassembled. Because mac80211 now also prevents the reassembly of -mixed encrypted and plaintext fragments, all cache attacks are prevented. - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be> -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> ---- - ---- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h -+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h -@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry { - u8 rx_queue; - bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */ - u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */ -+ unsigned int key_color; - }; - - ---- a/net/mac80211/key.c -+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c -@@ -799,6 +799,7 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_ - struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, - struct sta_info *sta) - { -+ static atomic_t key_color = ATOMIC_INIT(0); - struct ieee80211_key *old_key; - int idx = key->conf.keyidx; - bool pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE; -@@ -850,6 +851,12 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_ - key->sdata = sdata; - key->sta = sta; - -+ /* -+ * Assign a unique ID to every key so we can easily prevent mixed -+ * key and fragment cache attacks. -+ */ -+ key->color = atomic_inc_return(&key_color); -+ - increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); - - ret = ieee80211_key_replace(sdata, sta, pairwise, old_key, key); ---- a/net/mac80211/key.h -+++ b/net/mac80211/key.h -@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ struct ieee80211_key { - } debugfs; - #endif - -+ unsigned int color; -+ - /* - * key config, must be last because it contains key - * material as variable length member ---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c -+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c -@@ -2265,6 +2265,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802 - * next fragment has a sequential PN value. - */ - entry->check_sequential_pn = true; -+ entry->key_color = rx->key->color; - memcpy(entry->last_pn, - rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], - IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); -@@ -2302,6 +2303,11 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802 - - if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc)) - return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; -+ -+ /* Prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks */ -+ if (entry->key_color != rx->key->color) -+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; -+ - memcpy(pn, entry->last_pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); - for (i = IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) { - pn[i]++; diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/382-mac80211-properly-handle-A-MSDUs-that-start-with-an-.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/382-mac80211-properly-handle-A-MSDUs-that-start-with-an-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d59fa05091..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/382-mac80211-properly-handle-A-MSDUs-that-start-with-an-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,66 +0,0 @@ -From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be> -Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:44 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: properly handle A-MSDUs that start with an - RFC 1042 header - -Properly parse A-MSDUs whose first 6 bytes happen to equal a rfc1042 -header. This can occur in practice when the destination MAC address -equals AA:AA:03:00:00:00. More importantly, this simplifies the next -patch to mitigate A-MSDU injection attacks. - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be> -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> ---- - ---- a/include/net/cfg80211.h -+++ b/include/net/cfg80211.h -@@ -5637,7 +5637,7 @@ unsigned int ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen(s - */ - int ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ethhdr *ehdr, - const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype, -- u8 data_offset); -+ u8 data_offset, bool is_amsdu); - - /** - * ieee80211_data_to_8023 - convert an 802.11 data frame to 802.3 -@@ -5649,7 +5649,7 @@ int ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(struct - static inline int ieee80211_data_to_8023(struct sk_buff *skb, const u8 *addr, - enum nl80211_iftype iftype) - { -- return ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(skb, NULL, addr, iftype, 0); -+ return ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(skb, NULL, addr, iftype, 0, false); - } - - /** ---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c -+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c -@@ -2696,7 +2696,7 @@ __ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_ - if (ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(skb, ðhdr, - rx->sdata->vif.addr, - rx->sdata->vif.type, -- data_offset)) -+ data_offset, true)) - return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; - - ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(skb, &frame_list, dev->dev_addr, ---- a/net/wireless/util.c -+++ b/net/wireless/util.c -@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen) - - int ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ethhdr *ehdr, - const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype, -- u8 data_offset) -+ u8 data_offset, bool is_amsdu) - { - struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; - struct { -@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ int ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(struct - skb_copy_bits(skb, hdrlen, &payload, sizeof(payload)); - tmp.h_proto = payload.proto; - -- if (likely((ether_addr_equal(payload.hdr, rfc1042_header) && -+ if (likely((!is_amsdu && ether_addr_equal(payload.hdr, rfc1042_header) && - tmp.h_proto != htons(ETH_P_AARP) && - tmp.h_proto != htons(ETH_P_IPX)) || - ether_addr_equal(payload.hdr, bridge_tunnel_header))) diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/383-cfg80211-mitigate-A-MSDU-aggregation-attacks.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/383-cfg80211-mitigate-A-MSDU-aggregation-attacks.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 8ea78dca84..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/383-cfg80211-mitigate-A-MSDU-aggregation-attacks.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,40 +0,0 @@ -From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be> -Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:45 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] cfg80211: mitigate A-MSDU aggregation attacks - -Mitigate A-MSDU injection attacks (CVE-2020-24588) by detecting if the -destination address of a subframe equals an RFC1042 (i.e., LLC/SNAP) -header, and if so dropping the complete A-MSDU frame. This mitigates -known attacks, although new (unknown) aggregation-based attacks may -remain possible. - -This defense works because in A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, a -normal encrypted Wi-Fi frame is turned into an A-MSDU frame. This means -the first 6 bytes of the first A-MSDU subframe correspond to an RFC1042 -header. In other words, the destination MAC address of the first A-MSDU -subframe contains the start of an RFC1042 header during an aggregation -attack. We can detect this and thereby prevent this specific attack. -For details, see Section 7.2 of "Fragment and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi -Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation". - -Note that for kernel 4.9 and above this patch depends on "mac80211: -properly handle A-MSDUs that start with a rfc1042 header". Otherwise -this patch has no impact and attacks will remain possible. - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be> -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> ---- - ---- a/net/wireless/util.c -+++ b/net/wireless/util.c -@@ -775,6 +775,9 @@ void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_ - remaining = skb->len - offset; - if (subframe_len > remaining) - goto purge; -+ /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks */ -+ if (ether_addr_equal(eth.h_dest, rfc1042_header)) -+ goto purge; - - offset += sizeof(struct ethhdr); - last = remaining <= subframe_len + padding; diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/384-mac80211-drop-A-MSDUs-on-old-ciphers.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/384-mac80211-drop-A-MSDUs-on-old-ciphers.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 1b5084c37d..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/384-mac80211-drop-A-MSDUs-on-old-ciphers.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> -Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:46 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: drop A-MSDUs on old ciphers - -With old ciphers (WEP and TKIP) we shouldn't be using A-MSDUs -since A-MSDUs are only supported if we know that they are, and -the only practical way for that is HT support which doesn't -support old ciphers. - -However, we would normally accept them anyway. Since we check -the MMIC before deaggregating A-MSDUs, and the A-MSDU bit in -the QoS header is not protected in TKIP (or WEP), this enables -attacks similar to CVE-2020-24588. To prevent that, drop A-MSDUs -completely with old ciphers. - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> ---- - ---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c -+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c -@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ - * Copyright 2007-2010 Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> - * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH - * Copyright(c) 2015 - 2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH -- * Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Intel Corporation -+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Intel Corporation - */ - - #include <linux/jiffies.h> -@@ -2753,6 +2753,23 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_rx - if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) - return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; - -+ if (rx->key) { -+ /* -+ * We should not receive A-MSDUs on pre-HT connections, -+ * and HT connections cannot use old ciphers. Thus drop -+ * them, as in those cases we couldn't even have SPP -+ * A-MSDUs or such. -+ */ -+ switch (rx->key->conf.cipher) { -+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40: -+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104: -+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: -+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ - return __ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(rx, 0); - } - diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/385-mac80211-add-fragment-cache-to-sta_info.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/385-mac80211-add-fragment-cache-to-sta_info.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b536126d38..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/385-mac80211-add-fragment-cache-to-sta_info.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,313 +0,0 @@ -From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> -Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:47 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: add fragment cache to sta_info - -Prior patches protected against fragmentation cache attacks -by coloring keys, but this shows that it can lead to issues -when multiple stations use the same sequence number. Add a -fragment cache to struct sta_info (in addition to the one in -the interface) to separate fragments for different stations -properly. - -This then automatically clear most of the fragment cache when a -station disconnects (or reassociates) from an AP, or when client -interfaces disconnect from the network, etc. - -On the way, also fix the comment there since this brings us in line -with the recommendation in 802.11-2016 ("An AP should support ..."). -Additionally, remove a useless condition (since there's no problem -purging an already empty list). - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> ---- - ---- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h -+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h -@@ -50,12 +50,6 @@ struct ieee80211_local; - #define IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_HEADROOM 8 - #define IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM 18 - --/* IEEE 802.11 (Ch. 9.5 Defragmentation) requires support for concurrent -- * reception of at least three fragmented frames. This limit can be increased -- * by changing this define, at the cost of slower frame reassembly and -- * increased memory use (about 2 kB of RAM per entry). */ --#define IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX 4 -- - /* power level hasn't been configured (or set to automatic) */ - #define IEEE80211_UNSET_POWER_LEVEL INT_MIN - -@@ -88,19 +82,6 @@ extern const u8 ieee80211_ac_to_qos_mask - - #define IEEE80211_MAX_NAN_INSTANCE_ID 255 - --struct ieee80211_fragment_entry { -- struct sk_buff_head skb_list; -- unsigned long first_frag_time; -- u16 seq; -- u16 extra_len; -- u16 last_frag; -- u8 rx_queue; -- bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */ -- u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */ -- unsigned int key_color; --}; -- -- - struct ieee80211_bss { - u32 device_ts_beacon, device_ts_presp; - -@@ -912,9 +893,7 @@ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data { - - char name[IFNAMSIZ]; - -- /* Fragment table for host-based reassembly */ -- struct ieee80211_fragment_entry fragments[IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX]; -- unsigned int fragment_next; -+ struct ieee80211_fragment_cache frags; - - /* TID bitmap for NoAck policy */ - u16 noack_map; -@@ -2329,4 +2308,7 @@ u32 ieee80211_calc_expected_tx_airtime(s - #define debug_noinline - #endif - -+void ieee80211_init_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache); -+void ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache); -+ - #endif /* IEEE80211_I_H */ ---- a/net/mac80211/iface.c -+++ b/net/mac80211/iface.c -@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ - * Copyright 2008, Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> - * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH - * Copyright (c) 2016 Intel Deutschland GmbH -- * Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Intel Corporation -+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Intel Corporation - */ - #include <linux/slab.h> - #include <linux/kernel.h> -@@ -679,16 +679,12 @@ static void ieee80211_set_multicast_list - */ - static void ieee80211_teardown_sdata(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) - { -- int i; -- - /* free extra data */ - ieee80211_free_keys(sdata, false); - - ieee80211_debugfs_remove_netdev(sdata); - -- for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++) -- __skb_queue_purge(&sdata->fragments[i].skb_list); -- sdata->fragment_next = 0; -+ ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(&sdata->frags); - - if (ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&sdata->vif)) - ieee80211_mesh_teardown_sdata(sdata); -@@ -2038,8 +2034,7 @@ int ieee80211_if_add(struct ieee80211_lo - sdata->wdev.wiphy = local->hw.wiphy; - sdata->local = local; - -- for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++) -- skb_queue_head_init(&sdata->fragments[i].skb_list); -+ ieee80211_init_frag_cache(&sdata->frags); - - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sdata->key_list); - ---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c -+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c -@@ -2133,19 +2133,34 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_ - return result; - } - -+void ieee80211_init_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache) -+{ -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cache->entries); i++) -+ skb_queue_head_init(&cache->entries[i].skb_list); -+} -+ -+void ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache) -+{ -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cache->entries); i++) -+ __skb_queue_purge(&cache->entries[i].skb_list); -+} -+ - static inline struct ieee80211_fragment_entry * --ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, -+ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache, - unsigned int frag, unsigned int seq, int rx_queue, - struct sk_buff **skb) - { - struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry; - -- entry = &sdata->fragments[sdata->fragment_next++]; -- if (sdata->fragment_next >= IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX) -- sdata->fragment_next = 0; -+ entry = &cache->entries[cache->next++]; -+ if (cache->next >= IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX) -+ cache->next = 0; - -- if (!skb_queue_empty(&entry->skb_list)) -- __skb_queue_purge(&entry->skb_list); -+ __skb_queue_purge(&entry->skb_list); - - __skb_queue_tail(&entry->skb_list, *skb); /* no need for locking */ - *skb = NULL; -@@ -2160,14 +2175,14 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee8021 - } - - static inline struct ieee80211_fragment_entry * --ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, -+ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache, - unsigned int frag, unsigned int seq, - int rx_queue, struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr) - { - struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry; - int i, idx; - -- idx = sdata->fragment_next; -+ idx = cache->next; - for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++) { - struct ieee80211_hdr *f_hdr; - struct sk_buff *f_skb; -@@ -2176,7 +2191,7 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee802 - if (idx < 0) - idx = IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX - 1; - -- entry = &sdata->fragments[idx]; -+ entry = &cache->entries[idx]; - if (skb_queue_empty(&entry->skb_list) || entry->seq != seq || - entry->rx_queue != rx_queue || - entry->last_frag + 1 != frag) -@@ -2217,6 +2232,7 @@ static bool requires_sequential_pn(struc - static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline - ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) - { -+ struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache = &rx->sdata->frags; - struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; - u16 sc; - __le16 fc; -@@ -2238,6 +2254,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802 - goto out_no_led; - } - -+ if (rx->sta) -+ cache = &rx->sta->frags; -+ - if (likely(!ieee80211_has_morefrags(fc) && frag == 0)) - goto out; - -@@ -2256,7 +2275,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802 - - if (frag == 0) { - /* This is the first fragment of a new frame. */ -- entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(rx->sdata, frag, seq, -+ entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(cache, frag, seq, - rx->seqno_idx, &(rx->skb)); - if (requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc)) { - int queue = rx->security_idx; -@@ -2284,7 +2303,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802 - /* This is a fragment for a frame that should already be pending in - * fragment cache. Add this fragment to the end of the pending entry. - */ -- entry = ieee80211_reassemble_find(rx->sdata, frag, seq, -+ entry = ieee80211_reassemble_find(cache, frag, seq, - rx->seqno_idx, hdr); - if (!entry) { - I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->rx_handlers_drop_defrag); ---- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c -+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c -@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ - * Copyright 2006-2007 Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz> - * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH - * Copyright (C) 2015 - 2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH -- * Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Intel Corporation -+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Intel Corporation - */ - - #include <linux/module.h> -@@ -393,6 +393,8 @@ struct sta_info *sta_info_alloc(struct i - - u64_stats_init(&sta->rx_stats.syncp); - -+ ieee80211_init_frag_cache(&sta->frags); -+ - sta->sta_state = IEEE80211_STA_NONE; - - /* Mark TID as unreserved */ -@@ -1103,6 +1105,8 @@ static void __sta_info_destroy_part2(str - - ieee80211_sta_debugfs_remove(sta); - -+ ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(&sta->frags); -+ - cleanup_single_sta(sta); - } - ---- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h -+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h -@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ - * Copyright 2002-2005, Devicescape Software, Inc. - * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH - * Copyright(c) 2015-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH -- * Copyright(c) 2020 Intel Corporation -+ * Copyright(c) 2020-2021 Intel Corporation - */ - - #ifndef STA_INFO_H -@@ -439,6 +439,33 @@ struct ieee80211_sta_rx_stats { - }; - - /* -+ * IEEE 802.11-2016 (10.6 "Defragmentation") recommends support for "concurrent -+ * reception of at least one MSDU per access category per associated STA" -+ * on APs, or "at least one MSDU per access category" on other interface types. -+ * -+ * This limit can be increased by changing this define, at the cost of slower -+ * frame reassembly and increased memory use while fragments are pending. -+ */ -+#define IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX 4 -+ -+struct ieee80211_fragment_entry { -+ struct sk_buff_head skb_list; -+ unsigned long first_frag_time; -+ u16 seq; -+ u16 extra_len; -+ u16 last_frag; -+ u8 rx_queue; -+ bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */ -+ u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */ -+ unsigned int key_color; -+}; -+ -+struct ieee80211_fragment_cache { -+ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry entries[IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX]; -+ unsigned int next; -+}; -+ -+/* - * The bandwidth threshold below which the per-station CoDel parameters will be - * scaled to be more lenient (to prevent starvation of slow stations). This - * value will be scaled by the number of active stations when it is being -@@ -531,6 +558,7 @@ struct ieee80211_sta_rx_stats { - * @status_stats.last_ack_signal: last ACK signal - * @status_stats.ack_signal_filled: last ACK signal validity - * @status_stats.avg_ack_signal: average ACK signal -+ * @frags: fragment cache - */ - struct sta_info { - /* General information, mostly static */ -@@ -639,6 +667,8 @@ struct sta_info { - - struct cfg80211_chan_def tdls_chandef; - -+ struct ieee80211_fragment_cache frags; -+ - /* keep last! */ - struct ieee80211_sta sta; - }; diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/386-mac80211-check-defrag-PN-against-current-frame.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/386-mac80211-check-defrag-PN-against-current-frame.patch deleted file mode 100644 index fb2747a609..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/386-mac80211-check-defrag-PN-against-current-frame.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,109 +0,0 @@ -From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> -Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:48 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: check defrag PN against current frame - -As pointed out by Mathy Vanhoef, we implement the RX PN check -on fragmented frames incorrectly - we check against the last -received PN prior to the new frame, rather than to the one in -this frame itself. - -Prior patches addressed the security issue here, but in order -to be able to reason better about the code, fix it to really -compare against the current frame's PN, not the last stored -one. - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> ---- - ---- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h -+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h -@@ -227,8 +227,15 @@ struct ieee80211_rx_data { - */ - int security_idx; - -- u32 tkip_iv32; -- u16 tkip_iv16; -+ union { -+ struct { -+ u32 iv32; -+ u16 iv16; -+ } tkip; -+ struct { -+ u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN]; -+ } ccm_gcm; -+ }; - }; - - struct ieee80211_csa_settings { ---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c -+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c -@@ -2318,7 +2318,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802 - if (entry->check_sequential_pn) { - int i; - u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN], *rpn; -- int queue; - - if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc)) - return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; -@@ -2333,8 +2332,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802 - if (pn[i]) - break; - } -- queue = rx->security_idx; -- rpn = rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue]; -+ -+ rpn = rx->ccm_gcm.pn; - if (memcmp(pn, rpn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN)) - return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; - memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); ---- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c -+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c -@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ - * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc. - * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> - * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH -+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2021 Intel Corporation - */ - - #include <linux/netdevice.h> -@@ -167,8 +168,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct - - update_iv: - /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */ -- rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32; -- rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16; -+ rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip.iv32; -+ rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip.iv16; - - return RX_CONTINUE; - -@@ -294,8 +295,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee - key, skb->data + hdrlen, - skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr, - hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx, -- &rx->tkip_iv32, -- &rx->tkip_iv16); -+ &rx->tkip.iv32, -+ &rx->tkip.iv16); - if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK) - return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; - -@@ -552,6 +553,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee - } - - memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); -+ if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr))) -+ memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); - } - - /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */ -@@ -782,6 +785,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct iee - } - - memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); -+ if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr))) -+ memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); - } - - /* Remove GCMP header and MIC */ diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/387-mac80211-prevent-attacks-on-TKIP-WEP-as-well.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/387-mac80211-prevent-attacks-on-TKIP-WEP-as-well.patch deleted file mode 100644 index bc582a6cc2..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/387-mac80211-prevent-attacks-on-TKIP-WEP-as-well.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ -From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> -Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:49 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: prevent attacks on TKIP/WEP as well - -Similar to the issues fixed in previous patches, TKIP and WEP -should be protected even if for TKIP we have the Michael MIC -protecting it, and WEP is broken anyway. - -However, this also somewhat protects potential other algorithms -that drivers might implement. - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> ---- - ---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c -+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c -@@ -2284,6 +2284,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802 - * next fragment has a sequential PN value. - */ - entry->check_sequential_pn = true; -+ entry->is_protected = true; - entry->key_color = rx->key->color; - memcpy(entry->last_pn, - rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], -@@ -2296,6 +2297,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802 - sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue])); - BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN != - IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); -+ } else if (rx->key && ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) { -+ entry->is_protected = true; -+ entry->key_color = rx->key->color; - } - return RX_QUEUED; - } -@@ -2337,6 +2341,14 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802 - if (memcmp(pn, rpn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN)) - return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; - memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); -+ } else if (entry->is_protected && -+ (!rx->key || !ieee80211_has_protected(fc) || -+ rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) { -+ /* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even -+ * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a -+ * lost cause anyway. -+ */ -+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; - } - - skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc)); ---- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h -+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h -@@ -455,7 +455,8 @@ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry { - u16 extra_len; - u16 last_frag; - u8 rx_queue; -- bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */ -+ u8 check_sequential_pn:1, /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */ -+ is_protected:1; - u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */ - unsigned int key_color; - }; diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/388-mac80211-do-not-accept-forward-invalid-EAPOL-frames.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/388-mac80211-do-not-accept-forward-invalid-EAPOL-frames.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 9a0b78def1..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/388-mac80211-do-not-accept-forward-invalid-EAPOL-frames.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,94 +0,0 @@ -From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> -Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:50 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: do not accept/forward invalid EAPOL frames - -EAPOL frames are used for authentication and key management between the -AP and each individual STA associated in the BSS. Those frames are not -supposed to be sent by one associated STA to another associated STA -(either unicast for broadcast/multicast). - -Similarly, in 802.11 they're supposed to be sent to the authenticator -(AP) address. - -Since it is possible for unexpected EAPOL frames to result in misbehavior -in supplicant implementations, it is better for the AP to not allow such -cases to be forwarded to other clients either directly, or indirectly if -the AP interface is part of a bridge. - -Accept EAPOL (control port) frames only if they're transmitted to the -own address, or, due to interoperability concerns, to the PAE group -address. - -Disable forwarding of EAPOL (or well, the configured control port -protocol) frames back to wireless medium in all cases. Previously, these -frames were accepted from fully authenticated and authorized stations -and also from unauthenticated stations for one of the cases. - -Additionally, to avoid forwarding by the bridge, rewrite the PAE group -address case to the local MAC address. - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Co-developed-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> ---- - ---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c -+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c -@@ -2541,13 +2541,13 @@ static bool ieee80211_frame_allowed(stru - struct ethhdr *ehdr = (struct ethhdr *) rx->skb->data; - - /* -- * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless -- * of whether the frame was encrypted or not. -+ * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless of -+ * whether the frame was encrypted or not, and always disallow -+ * all other destination addresses for them. - */ -- if (ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol && -- (ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) || -- ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr))) -- return true; -+ if (unlikely(ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol)) -+ return ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) || -+ ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr); - - if (ieee80211_802_1x_port_control(rx) || - ieee80211_drop_unencrypted(rx, fc)) -@@ -2572,8 +2572,28 @@ static void ieee80211_deliver_skb_to_loc - cfg80211_rx_control_port(dev, skb, noencrypt); - dev_kfree_skb(skb); - } else { -+ struct ethhdr *ehdr = (void *)skb_mac_header(skb); -+ - memset(skb->cb, 0, sizeof(skb->cb)); - -+ /* -+ * 802.1X over 802.11 requires that the authenticator address -+ * be used for EAPOL frames. However, 802.1X allows the use of -+ * the PAE group address instead. If the interface is part of -+ * a bridge and we pass the frame with the PAE group address, -+ * then the bridge will forward it to the network (even if the -+ * client was not associated yet), which isn't supposed to -+ * happen. -+ * To avoid that, rewrite the destination address to our own -+ * address, so that the authenticator (e.g. hostapd) will see -+ * the frame, but bridge won't forward it anywhere else. Note -+ * that due to earlier filtering, the only other address can -+ * be the PAE group address. -+ */ -+ if (unlikely(skb->protocol == sdata->control_port_protocol && -+ !ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr))) -+ ether_addr_copy(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr); -+ - /* deliver to local stack */ - if (rx->list) - #if LINUX_VERSION_IS_GEQ(4,19,0) -@@ -2617,6 +2637,7 @@ ieee80211_deliver_skb(struct ieee80211_r - if ((sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP || - sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) && - !(sdata->flags & IEEE80211_SDATA_DONT_BRIDGE_PACKETS) && -+ ehdr->h_proto != rx->sdata->control_port_protocol && - (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN || !sdata->u.vlan.sta)) { - if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ehdr->h_dest) && - ieee80211_vif_get_num_mcast_if(sdata) != 0) { diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/389-mac80211-extend-protection-against-mixed-key-and-fra.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/389-mac80211-extend-protection-against-mixed-key-and-fra.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 17809263e9..0000000000 --- a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/subsys/389-mac80211-extend-protection-against-mixed-key-and-fra.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,68 +0,0 @@ -From: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org> -Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:51 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: extend protection against mixed key and - fragment cache attacks - -For some chips/drivers, e.g., QCA6174 with ath10k, the decryption is -done by the hardware, and the Protected bit in the Frame Control field -is cleared in the lower level driver before the frame is passed to -mac80211. In such cases, the condition for ieee80211_has_protected() is -not met in ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() of mac80211 and the new security -validation steps are not executed. - -Extend mac80211 to cover the case where the Protected bit has been -cleared, but the frame is indicated as having been decrypted by the -hardware. This extends protection against mixed key and fragment cache -attack for additional drivers/chips. This fixes CVE-2020-24586 and -CVE-2020-24587 for such cases. - -Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1 - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org> -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> -Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> ---- - ---- a/net/mac80211/rx.c -+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c -@@ -2239,6 +2239,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802 - unsigned int frag, seq; - struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry; - struct sk_buff *skb; -+ struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb); - - hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; - fc = hdr->frame_control; -@@ -2297,7 +2298,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802 - sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue])); - BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN != - IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); -- } else if (rx->key && ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) { -+ } else if (rx->key && -+ (ieee80211_has_protected(fc) || -+ (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))) { - entry->is_protected = true; - entry->key_color = rx->key->color; - } -@@ -2342,13 +2345,19 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee802 - return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; - memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); - } else if (entry->is_protected && -- (!rx->key || !ieee80211_has_protected(fc) || -+ (!rx->key || -+ (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc) && -+ !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) || - rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) { - /* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even - * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a - * lost cause anyway. - */ - return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; -+ } else if (entry->is_protected && rx->key && -+ entry->key_color != rx->key->color && -+ (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { -+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; - } - - skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc)); |