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| author | Rafał Miłecki <rafal@milecki.pl> | 2016-09-27 06:58:01 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Rafał Miłecki <rafal@milecki.pl> | 2016-09-27 07:00:53 +0200 |
| commit | 45b73af7f6020b1c3e3d7170d3b1ba86edabfc60 (patch) | |
| tree | ba0ed4e91cff6d97c1a516f9d61d86438c0439fe /package/kernel/mac80211/patches/319-0017-brcmfmac-avoid-potential-stack-overflow-in-brcmf_cfg.patch | |
| parent | 5b99693832d0307744ac16d29fb359b730fd86a3 (diff) | |
| download | upstream-45b73af7f6020b1c3e3d7170d3b1ba86edabfc60.tar.gz upstream-45b73af7f6020b1c3e3d7170d3b1ba86edabfc60.tar.bz2 upstream-45b73af7f6020b1c3e3d7170d3b1ba86edabfc60.zip | |
mac80211: backport brcmfmac changes from 2016-09-26
All these patches are in wireless-drirvers-next. There is support for
hidden SSID, few new devices and many fixes.
Signed-off-by: Rafał Miłecki <rafal@milecki.pl>
Diffstat (limited to 'package/kernel/mac80211/patches/319-0017-brcmfmac-avoid-potential-stack-overflow-in-brcmf_cfg.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | package/kernel/mac80211/patches/319-0017-brcmfmac-avoid-potential-stack-overflow-in-brcmf_cfg.patch | 34 |
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/319-0017-brcmfmac-avoid-potential-stack-overflow-in-brcmf_cfg.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/319-0017-brcmfmac-avoid-potential-stack-overflow-in-brcmf_cfg.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a56dd72c46 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/319-0017-brcmfmac-avoid-potential-stack-overflow-in-brcmf_cfg.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From ded89912156b1a47d940a0c954c43afbabd0c42c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Arend Van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com> +Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2016 10:45:47 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in + brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap() + +User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw +IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding +the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it +into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be +corrupted and used as exploit. + +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7 +Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com> +Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com> +Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com> +Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com> +Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com> +Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> +--- + drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c +@@ -4523,7 +4523,7 @@ brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap(struct wiphy *wi + (u8 *)&settings->beacon.head[ie_offset], + settings->beacon.head_len - ie_offset, + WLAN_EID_SSID); +- if (!ssid_ie) ++ if (!ssid_ie || ssid_ie->len > IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN) + return -EINVAL; + + memcpy(ssid_le.SSID, ssid_ie->data, ssid_ie->len); |