mac80211: update to version 2015-06-22

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>

SVN-Revision: 46198

1 files changed, 374 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..55a1ccd907
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
+--- a/net/mac80211/Makefile
++++ b/net/mac80211/Makefile
+@@ -15,9 +15,7 @@ mac80211-y := \
+ 	michael.o \
+ 	tkip.o \
+ 	aes_ccm.o \
+-	aes_gcm.o \
+ 	aes_cmac.o \
+-	aes_gmac.o \
+ 	cfg.o \
+ 	ethtool.o \
+ 	rx.o \
+--- a/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h
++++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h
+@@ -11,12 +11,28 @@
+ 
+ #include <linux/crypto.h>
+ 
+-void ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
+-			       u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic);
+-int ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
+-			      u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic);
+-struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
+-							size_t key_len);
+-void ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm);
++static inline void
++ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
++			  u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
++{
++}
++
++static inline int
++ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
++			  u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
++{
++    return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++}
++
++static inline struct crypto_aead *
++ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[], size_t key_len)
++{
++    return NULL;
++}
++
++static inline void
++ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
++{
++}
+ 
+ #endif /* AES_GCM_H */
+--- a/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h
++++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h
+@@ -11,10 +11,22 @@
+ 
+ #include <linux/crypto.h>
+ 
+-struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(const u8 key[],
+-						 size_t key_len);
+-int ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce,
+-		       const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic);
+-void ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm);
++static inline struct crypto_aead *
++ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(const u8 key[], size_t key_len)
++{
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++static inline int
++ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce,
++		   const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
++{
++	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++}
++
++static inline void
++ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
++{
++}
+ 
+ #endif /* AES_GMAC_H */
+--- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
+@@ -19,86 +19,126 @@
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "aes_ccm.h"
+ 
+-void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
++static void aes_ccm_prepare(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, u8 *s_0,
++			    u8 *a, u8 *b)
++{
++	int i;
++
++	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, b_0);
++
++	/* Extra Authenticate-only data (always two AES blocks) */
++	for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++)
++		aad[i] ^= b[i];
++	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, aad);
++
++	aad += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++)
++		aad[i] ^= b[i];
++	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, a, aad);
++
++	/* Mask out bits from auth-only-b_0 */
++	b_0[0] &= 0x07;
++
++	/* S_0 is used to encrypt T (= MIC) */
++	b_0[14] = 0;
++	b_0[15] = 0;
++	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, s_0, b_0);
++}
++
++
++void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+ 			       u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
+ 			       size_t mic_len)
+ {
+-	struct scatterlist assoc, pt, ct[2];
++	int i, j, last_len, num_blocks;
++	u8 b[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++	u8 s_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++	u8 e[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++	u8 *pos, *cpos;
++
++	num_blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(data_len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++	last_len = data_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++	aes_ccm_prepare(tfm, b_0, aad, s_0, b, b);
++
++	/* Process payload blocks */
++	pos = data;
++	cpos = data;
++	for (j = 1; j <= num_blocks; j++) {
++		int blen = (j == num_blocks && last_len) ?
++			last_len : AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++
++		/* Authentication followed by encryption */
++		for (i = 0; i < blen; i++)
++			b[i] ^= pos[i];
++		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, b);
++
++		b_0[14] = (j >> 8) & 0xff;
++		b_0[15] = j & 0xff;
++		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, e, b_0);
++		for (i = 0; i < blen; i++)
++			*cpos++ = *pos++ ^ e[i];
++	}
+ 
+-	char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) +
+-			   crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)]
+-		__aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request));
+-	struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *) aead_req_data;
+-
+-	memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data));
+-
+-	sg_init_one(&pt, data, data_len);
+-	sg_init_one(&assoc, &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));
+-	sg_init_table(ct, 2);
+-	sg_set_buf(&ct[0], data, data_len);
+-	sg_set_buf(&ct[1], mic, mic_len);
+-
+-	aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm);
+-	aead_request_set_assoc(aead_req, &assoc, assoc.length);
+-	aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &pt, ct, data_len, b_0);
+-
+-	crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
++	for (i = 0; i < mic_len; i++)
++		mic[i] = b[i] ^ s_0[i];
+ }
+ 
+-int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
++int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+ 			      u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
+ 			      size_t mic_len)
+ {
+-	struct scatterlist assoc, pt, ct[2];
+-	char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) +
+-			   crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)]
+-		__aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request));
+-	struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *) aead_req_data;
+-
+-	if (data_len == 0)
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-
+-	memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data));
+-
+-	sg_init_one(&pt, data, data_len);
+-	sg_init_one(&assoc, &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));
+-	sg_init_table(ct, 2);
+-	sg_set_buf(&ct[0], data, data_len);
+-	sg_set_buf(&ct[1], mic, mic_len);
+-
+-	aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm);
+-	aead_request_set_assoc(aead_req, &assoc, assoc.length);
+-	aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, ct, &pt, data_len + mic_len, b_0);
++	int i, j, last_len, num_blocks;
++	u8 *pos, *cpos;
++	u8 a[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++	u8 b[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++	u8 s_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++
++	num_blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(data_len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++	last_len = data_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++	aes_ccm_prepare(tfm, b_0, aad, s_0, a, b);
++
++	/* Process payload blocks */
++	cpos = data;
++	pos = data;
++	for (j = 1; j <= num_blocks; j++) {
++		int blen = (j == num_blocks && last_len) ?
++			last_len : AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++
++		/* Decryption followed by authentication */
++		b_0[14] = (j >> 8) & 0xff;
++		b_0[15] = j & 0xff;
++		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, b_0);
++		for (i = 0; i < blen; i++) {
++			*pos = *cpos++ ^ b[i];
++			a[i] ^= *pos++;
++		}
++		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, a, a);
++	}
++
++	for (i = 0; i < mic_len; i++) {
++		if ((mic[i] ^ s_0[i]) != a[i])
++			return -1;
++	}
+ 
+-	return crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
+-						    size_t key_len,
+-						    size_t mic_len)
++struct crypto_cipher *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
++						      size_t key_len,
++						      size_t mic_len)
+ {
+-	struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+-	int err;
++	struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
+ 
+-	tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("ccm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+-	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+-		return tfm;
+-
+-	err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, key_len);
+-	if (err)
+-		goto free_aead;
+-	err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, mic_len);
+-	if (err)
+-		goto free_aead;
++	tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
++	if (!IS_ERR(tfm))
++		crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, key_len);
+ 
+ 	return tfm;
+-
+-free_aead:
+-	crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+-	return ERR_PTR(err);
+ }
+ 
+-void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
++
++void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_cipher *tfm)
+ {
+-	crypto_free_aead(tfm);
++	crypto_free_cipher(tfm);
+ }
+--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
++++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
+@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
+ 			 * Management frames.
+ 			 */
+ 			u8 rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1][IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
+-			struct crypto_aead *tfm;
++			struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
+ 			u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
+ 		} ccmp;
+ 		struct {
+--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+@@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
++static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
++				u16 data_len)
+ {
+ 	__le16 mask_fc;
+ 	int a4_included, mgmt;
+@@ -334,14 +335,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s
+ 	else
+ 		qos_tid = 0;
+ 
+-	/* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
+-	 * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
+-	 * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
+-	 * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
+-	 * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
+-	 * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
+-	 */
+-	b_0[0] = 0x1;
++	/* First block, b_0 */
++	b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */
+ 
+ 	/* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
+ 	 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
+@@ -349,6 +344,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s
+ 	b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
+ 	memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
+ 	memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
++	/* l(m) */
++	put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]);
+ 
+ 	/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
+ 	 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
+@@ -460,7 +457,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ 	pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
+-	ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
++	ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, len);
+ 	ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
+ 				  skb_put(skb, mic_len), mic_len);
+ 
+@@ -531,7 +528,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee
+ 			u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ 			u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ 			/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
+-			ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
++			ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, data_len);
+ 
+ 			if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
+ 				    key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
+--- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
++++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
+@@ -12,15 +12,15 @@
+ 
+ #include <linux/crypto.h>
+ 
+-struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
+-						    size_t key_len,
+-						    size_t mic_len);
+-void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
++struct crypto_cipher *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
++						      size_t key_len,
++						      size_t mic_len);
++void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+ 			       u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
+ 			       size_t mic_len);
+-int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
++int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+ 			      u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
+ 			      size_t mic_len);
+-void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm);
++void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_cipher *tfm);
+ 
+ #endif /* AES_CCM_H */
+--- a/net/mac80211/Kconfig
++++ b/net/mac80211/Kconfig
+@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ config MAC80211
+ 	depends on CRYPTO
+ 	depends on CRYPTO_ARC4
+ 	depends on CRYPTO_AES
+-	select BPAUTO_CRYPTO_CCM
+-	depends on CRYPTO_GCM
+ 	depends on CRC32
+ 	select BPAUTO_AVERAGE
+ 	---help---