BB: samba36: add three CVE patches from 2015-12-16

This is a patch for CVE-2015-5252, CVE-2015-5296 and CVE-2015-5299. A
patchset for these vulnerabilities was published on 16th December 2015.

Signed-off-by: Jan Čermák <jan.cermak@nic.cz>

Backport of r48133

git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/branches/barrier_breaker@48199 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73

4 files changed, 253 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/Makefile b/package/network/services/samba36/Makefile
index 344909f0bc..87d7002f43 100644
--- a/package/network/services/samba36/Makefile
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/Makefile
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=samba
 PKG_VERSION:=3.6.25
-PKG_RELEASE:=1
+PKG_RELEASE:=1.1
 
 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://ftp.samba.org/pub/samba \
 	http://ftp.samba.org/pub/samba/stable
diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/010-patch-cve-2015-5252.patch b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/010-patch-cve-2015-5252.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8922a6e505
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/010-patch-cve-2015-5252.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 2e94b6ec10f1d15e24867bab3063bb85f173406a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2015 10:58:11 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2015-5252: s3: smbd: Fix symlink verification (file
+ access outside the share).
+
+Ensure matching component ends in '/' or '\0'.
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11395
+
+Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/smbd/vfs.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/smbd/vfs.c b/source3/smbd/vfs.c
+index 6c56964..bd93b7f 100644
+--- a/source3/smbd/vfs.c
++++ b/source3/smbd/vfs.c
+@@ -982,6 +982,7 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname)
+ 	if (!allow_widelinks || !allow_symlinks) {
+ 		const char *conn_rootdir;
+ 		size_t rootdir_len;
++		bool matched;
+ 
+ 		conn_rootdir = SMB_VFS_CONNECTPATH(conn, fname);
+ 		if (conn_rootdir == NULL) {
+@@ -992,8 +993,10 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname)
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		rootdir_len = strlen(conn_rootdir);
+-		if (strncmp(conn_rootdir, resolved_name,
+-				rootdir_len) != 0) {
++		matched = (strncmp(conn_rootdir, resolved_name,
++				rootdir_len) == 0);
++		if (!matched || (resolved_name[rootdir_len] != '/' &&
++				 resolved_name[rootdir_len] != '\0')) {
+ 			DEBUG(2, ("check_reduced_name: Bad access "
+ 				"attempt: %s is a symlink outside the "
+ 				"share path\n", fname));
+-- 
+2.5.0
diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/011-patch-cve-2015-5296.patch b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/011-patch-cve-2015-5296.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eaafd1c667
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/011-patch-cve-2015-5296.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From 25139116756cc285a3a5534834cc276ef1b7baaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2015 21:17:02 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2015-5296: s3:libsmb: force signing when requiring
+ encryption in do_connect()
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11536
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+index 23e1471..f153b6b 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ static struct cli_state *do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ 	const char *username;
+ 	const char *password;
+ 	NTSTATUS status;
++	int signing_state = get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(auth_info);
++
++	if (force_encrypt) {
++		signing_state = Required;
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* make a copy so we don't modify the global string 'service' */
+ 	servicename = talloc_strdup(ctx,share);
+@@ -132,7 +137,7 @@ static struct cli_state *do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ 	zero_sockaddr(&ss);
+ 
+ 	/* have to open a new connection */
+-	c = cli_initialise_ex(get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(auth_info));
++	c = cli_initialise_ex(signing_state);
+ 	if (c == NULL) {
+ 		d_printf("Connection to %s failed\n", server_n);
+ 		return NULL;
+-- 
+2.5.0
+
+
+From 060adb0abdeda51b8b622c6020b5dea0c8dde1cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2015 21:17:02 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2015-5296: s3:libsmb: force signing when requiring
+ encryption in SMBC_server_internal()
+
+BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11536
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c | 13 +++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c
+index 45be660..167f2c9 100644
+--- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c
++++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c
+@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ SMBC_server_internal(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+         const char *username_used;
+  	NTSTATUS status;
+ 	char *newserver, *newshare;
++	int signing_state = Undefined;
+ 
+ 	zero_sockaddr(&ss);
+ 	ZERO_STRUCT(c);
+@@ -404,8 +405,12 @@ again:
+ 
+ 	zero_sockaddr(&ss);
+ 
++	if (context->internal->smb_encryption_level != SMBC_ENCRYPTLEVEL_NONE) {
++		signing_state = Required;
++	}
++
+ 	/* have to open a new connection */
+-	if ((c = cli_initialise()) == NULL) {
++	if ((c = cli_initialise_ex(signing_state)) == NULL) {
+ 		errno = ENOMEM;
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	}
+@@ -750,6 +755,7 @@ SMBC_attr_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+         ipc_srv = SMBC_find_server(ctx, context, server, "*IPC$",
+                                    pp_workgroup, pp_username, pp_password);
+         if (!ipc_srv) {
++		int signing_state = Undefined;
+ 
+                 /* We didn't find a cached connection.  Get the password */
+ 		if (!*pp_password || (*pp_password)[0] == '\0') {
+@@ -771,6 +777,9 @@ SMBC_attr_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+                 if (smbc_getOptionUseCCache(context)) {
+                         flags |= CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_CCACHE;
+                 }
++		if (context->internal->smb_encryption_level != SMBC_ENCRYPTLEVEL_NONE) {
++			signing_state = Required;
++		}
+ 
+                 zero_sockaddr(&ss);
+                 nt_status = cli_full_connection(&ipc_cli,
+@@ -780,7 +789,7 @@ SMBC_attr_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ 						*pp_workgroup,
+ 						*pp_password,
+ 						flags,
+-						Undefined);
++						signing_state);
+                 if (! NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+                         DEBUG(1,("cli_full_connection failed! (%s)\n",
+                                  nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+-- 
+2.5.0
diff --git a/package/network/services/samba36/patches/012-patch-cve-2015-5299.patch b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/012-patch-cve-2015-5299.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..19cbb19890
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/samba36/patches/012-patch-cve-2015-5299.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+From 8e49de7754f7171a58a1f94dee0f1138dbee3c60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 14:54:31 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2015-5299: s3-shadow-copy2: fix missing access check on
+ snapdir
+
+Fix originally from <partha@exablox.com>
+
+https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11529
+
+Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
+---
+ source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c b/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c
+index fedfb53..16c1ed7 100644
+--- a/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c
++++ b/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c
+@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ #include "smbd/smbd.h"
++#include "smbd/globals.h"
++#include "../libcli/security/security.h"
+ #include "system/filesys.h"
+ #include "ntioctl.h"
+ 
+@@ -764,6 +766,43 @@ static int shadow_copy2_mkdir(vfs_handle_struct *handle,  const char *fname, mod
+         SHADOW2_NEXT(MKDIR, (handle, name, mode), int, -1);
+ }
+ 
++static bool check_access_snapdir(struct vfs_handle_struct *handle,
++				const char *path)
++{
++	struct smb_filename smb_fname;
++	int ret;
++	NTSTATUS status;
++	uint32_t access_granted = 0;
++
++	ZERO_STRUCT(smb_fname);
++	smb_fname.base_name = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(),
++						"%s",
++						path);
++	if (smb_fname.base_name == NULL) {
++		return false;
++	}
++
++	ret = SMB_VFS_NEXT_STAT(handle, &smb_fname);
++	if (ret != 0 || !S_ISDIR(smb_fname.st.st_ex_mode)) {
++		TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname.base_name);
++		return false;
++	}
++
++	status = smbd_check_open_rights(handle->conn,
++					&smb_fname,
++					SEC_DIR_LIST,
++					&access_granted);
++	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
++		DEBUG(0,("user does not have list permission "
++			"on snapdir %s\n",
++			smb_fname.base_name));
++		TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname.base_name);
++		return false;
++	}
++	TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname.base_name);
++	return true;
++}
++
+ static int shadow_copy2_rmdir(vfs_handle_struct *handle,  const char *fname)
+ {
+         SHADOW2_NEXT(RMDIR, (handle, name), int, -1);
+@@ -877,6 +916,7 @@ static int shadow_copy2_get_shadow_copy2_data(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
+ 	SMB_STRUCT_DIRENT *d;
+ 	TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(handle->data);
+ 	char *snapshot;
++	bool ret;
+ 
+ 	snapdir = shadow_copy2_find_snapdir(tmp_ctx, handle);
+ 	if (snapdir == NULL) {
+@@ -886,6 +926,13 @@ static int shadow_copy2_get_shadow_copy2_data(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
+ 		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	ret = check_access_snapdir(handle, snapdir);
++	if (!ret) {
++		DEBUG(0,("access denied on listing snapdir %s\n", snapdir));
++		errno = EACCES;
++		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
++		return -1;
++	}
+ 
+ 	p = SMB_VFS_NEXT_OPENDIR(handle, snapdir, NULL, 0);
+ 
+-- 
+2.5.0