From 716ca530e1c4515d8683c9d5be3d56b301758b66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James <> Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2015 11:49:21 +0000 Subject: trunk-47381 --- .../100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch | 376 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 376 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch (limited to 'package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch') diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..02f46c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch @@ -0,0 +1,376 @@ +--- a/net/mac80211/Kconfig ++++ b/net/mac80211/Kconfig +@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ config MAC80211 + depends on CRYPTO + depends on CRYPTO_ARC4 + depends on CRYPTO_AES +- select BPAUTO_CRYPTO_CCM +- depends on CRYPTO_GCM + depends on CRC32 + ---help--- + This option enables the hardware independent IEEE 802.11 +--- a/net/mac80211/Makefile ++++ b/net/mac80211/Makefile +@@ -16,9 +16,7 @@ mac80211-y := \ + michael.o \ + tkip.o \ + aes_ccm.o \ +- aes_gcm.o \ + aes_cmac.o \ +- aes_gmac.o \ + cfg.o \ + ethtool.o \ + rx.o \ +--- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c ++++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c +@@ -13,89 +13,132 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + #include + #include "key.h" + #include "aes_ccm.h" + +-void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, +- u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic, +- size_t mic_len) ++static void aes_ccm_prepare(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, u8 *s_0, ++ u8 *a, u8 *b) + { +- struct scatterlist sg[3]; ++ int i; ++ ++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, b_0); ++ ++ /* Extra Authenticate-only data (always two AES blocks) */ ++ for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++) ++ aad[i] ^= b[i]; ++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, aad); ++ ++ aad += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++) ++ aad[i] ^= b[i]; ++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, a, aad); + +- char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) + +- crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)] +- __aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request)); +- struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *) aead_req_data; ++ /* Mask out bits from auth-only-b_0 */ ++ b_0[0] &= 0x07; + +- memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data)); ++ /* S_0 is used to encrypt T (= MIC) */ ++ b_0[14] = 0; ++ b_0[15] = 0; ++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, s_0, b_0); ++} + +- sg_init_table(sg, 3); +- sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad)); +- sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len); +- sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, mic_len); + +- aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm); +- aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, data_len, b_0); +- aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length); ++void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, ++ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic, ++ size_t mic_len) ++{ ++ int i, j, last_len, num_blocks; ++ u8 b[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ u8 s_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ u8 e[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ u8 *pos, *cpos; ++ ++ num_blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(data_len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ last_len = data_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ aes_ccm_prepare(tfm, b_0, aad, s_0, b, b); ++ ++ /* Process payload blocks */ ++ pos = data; ++ cpos = data; ++ for (j = 1; j <= num_blocks; j++) { ++ int blen = (j == num_blocks && last_len) ? ++ last_len : AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ ++ /* Authentication followed by encryption */ ++ for (i = 0; i < blen; i++) ++ b[i] ^= pos[i]; ++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, b); ++ ++ b_0[14] = (j >> 8) & 0xff; ++ b_0[15] = j & 0xff; ++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, e, b_0); ++ for (i = 0; i < blen; i++) ++ *cpos++ = *pos++ ^ e[i]; ++ } + +- crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req); ++ for (i = 0; i < mic_len; i++) ++ mic[i] = b[i] ^ s_0[i]; + } + +-int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, ++int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, + u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic, + size_t mic_len) + { +- struct scatterlist sg[3]; +- char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) + +- crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)] +- __aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request)); +- struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *) aead_req_data; +- +- if (data_len == 0) +- return -EINVAL; +- +- memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data)); +- +- sg_init_table(sg, 3); +- sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad)); +- sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len); +- sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, mic_len); +- +- aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm); +- aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, data_len + mic_len, b_0); +- aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length); ++ int i, j, last_len, num_blocks; ++ u8 *pos, *cpos; ++ u8 a[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ u8 b[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ u8 s_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; ++ ++ num_blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(data_len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ last_len = data_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ aes_ccm_prepare(tfm, b_0, aad, s_0, a, b); ++ ++ /* Process payload blocks */ ++ cpos = data; ++ pos = data; ++ for (j = 1; j <= num_blocks; j++) { ++ int blen = (j == num_blocks && last_len) ? ++ last_len : AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++ ++ /* Decryption followed by authentication */ ++ b_0[14] = (j >> 8) & 0xff; ++ b_0[15] = j & 0xff; ++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, b_0); ++ for (i = 0; i < blen; i++) { ++ *pos = *cpos++ ^ b[i]; ++ a[i] ^= *pos++; ++ } ++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, a, a); ++ } ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < mic_len; i++) { ++ if ((mic[i] ^ s_0[i]) != a[i]) ++ return -1; ++ } + +- return crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req); ++ return 0; + } + +-struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[], +- size_t key_len, +- size_t mic_len) ++struct crypto_cipher *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[], ++ size_t key_len, ++ size_t mic_len) + { +- struct crypto_aead *tfm; +- int err; ++ struct crypto_cipher *tfm; + +- tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("ccm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); +- if (IS_ERR(tfm)) +- return tfm; +- +- err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, key_len); +- if (err) +- goto free_aead; +- err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, mic_len); +- if (err) +- goto free_aead; ++ tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); ++ if (!IS_ERR(tfm)) ++ crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, key_len); + + return tfm; +- +-free_aead: +- crypto_free_aead(tfm); +- return ERR_PTR(err); + } + +-void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm) ++ ++void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_cipher *tfm) + { +- crypto_free_aead(tfm); ++ crypto_free_cipher(tfm); + } +--- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h ++++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h +@@ -12,15 +12,15 @@ + + #include + +-struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[], +- size_t key_len, +- size_t mic_len); +-void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, ++struct crypto_cipher *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[], ++ size_t key_len, ++ size_t mic_len); ++void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, + u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic, + size_t mic_len); +-int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, ++int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, + u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic, + size_t mic_len); +-void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm); ++void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_cipher *tfm); + + #endif /* AES_CCM_H */ +--- a/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h ++++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h +@@ -11,12 +11,28 @@ + + #include + +-void ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad, +- u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic); +-int ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad, +- u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic); +-struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[], +- size_t key_len); +-void ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm); ++static inline void ++ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad, ++ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic) ++{ ++} ++ ++static inline int ++ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad, ++ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic) ++{ ++ return -EOPNOTSUPP; ++} ++ ++static inline struct crypto_aead * ++ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[], size_t key_len) ++{ ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++static inline void ++ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm) ++{ ++} + + #endif /* AES_GCM_H */ +--- a/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h ++++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h +@@ -11,10 +11,22 @@ + + #include + +-struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(const u8 key[], +- size_t key_len); +-int ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce, +- const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic); +-void ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm); ++static inline struct crypto_aead * ++ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(const u8 key[], size_t key_len) ++{ ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++static inline int ++ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce, ++ const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic) ++{ ++ return -EOPNOTSUPP; ++} ++ ++static inline void ++ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm) ++{ ++} + + #endif /* AES_GMAC_H */ +--- a/net/mac80211/key.h ++++ b/net/mac80211/key.h +@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ struct ieee80211_key { + * Management frames. + */ + u8 rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1][IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN]; +- struct crypto_aead *tfm; ++ struct crypto_cipher *tfm; + u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */ + } ccmp; + struct { +--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c ++++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c +@@ -307,7 +307,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee + } + + +-static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad) ++static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, ++ u16 data_len) + { + __le16 mask_fc; + int a4_included, mgmt; +@@ -337,14 +338,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s + else + qos_tid = 0; + +- /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC +- * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived +- * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the +- * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take +- * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting +- * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs. +- */ +- b_0[0] = 0x1; ++ /* First block, b_0 */ ++ b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */ + + /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN + * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7) +@@ -352,6 +347,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s + b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4); + memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); + memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); ++ /* l(m) */ ++ put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]); + + /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header + * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */ +@@ -463,7 +460,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8 + return 0; + + pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; +- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad); ++ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, len); + ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len, + skb_put(skb, mic_len), mic_len); + +@@ -534,7 +531,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee + u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ +- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad); ++ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, data_len); + + if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt( + key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, -- cgit v1.2.3