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-rw-r--r--package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch376
1 files changed, 376 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02f46c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/kernel/mac80211/patches/100-remove-cryptoapi-dependencies.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,376 @@
+--- a/net/mac80211/Kconfig
++++ b/net/mac80211/Kconfig
+@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ config MAC80211
+ depends on CRYPTO
+ depends on CRYPTO_ARC4
+ depends on CRYPTO_AES
+- select BPAUTO_CRYPTO_CCM
+- depends on CRYPTO_GCM
+ depends on CRC32
+ ---help---
+ This option enables the hardware independent IEEE 802.11
+--- a/net/mac80211/Makefile
++++ b/net/mac80211/Makefile
+@@ -16,9 +16,7 @@ mac80211-y := \
+ michael.o \
+ tkip.o \
+ aes_ccm.o \
+- aes_gcm.o \
+ aes_cmac.o \
+- aes_gmac.o \
+ cfg.o \
+ ethtool.o \
+ rx.o \
+--- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c
+@@ -13,89 +13,132 @@
+ #include <linux/types.h>
+ #include <linux/err.h>
+ #include <crypto/aead.h>
++#include <crypto/aes.h>
+
+ #include <net/mac80211.h>
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "aes_ccm.h"
+
+-void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+- u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
+- size_t mic_len)
++static void aes_ccm_prepare(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, u8 *s_0,
++ u8 *a, u8 *b)
+ {
+- struct scatterlist sg[3];
++ int i;
++
++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, b_0);
++
++ /* Extra Authenticate-only data (always two AES blocks) */
++ for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++)
++ aad[i] ^= b[i];
++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, aad);
++
++ aad += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++)
++ aad[i] ^= b[i];
++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, a, aad);
+
+- char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) +
+- crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)]
+- __aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request));
+- struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *) aead_req_data;
++ /* Mask out bits from auth-only-b_0 */
++ b_0[0] &= 0x07;
+
+- memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data));
++ /* S_0 is used to encrypt T (= MIC) */
++ b_0[14] = 0;
++ b_0[15] = 0;
++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, s_0, b_0);
++}
+
+- sg_init_table(sg, 3);
+- sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));
+- sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len);
+- sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, mic_len);
+
+- aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm);
+- aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, data_len, b_0);
+- aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length);
++void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
++ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
++ size_t mic_len)
++{
++ int i, j, last_len, num_blocks;
++ u8 b[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++ u8 s_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++ u8 e[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++ u8 *pos, *cpos;
++
++ num_blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(data_len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++ last_len = data_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++ aes_ccm_prepare(tfm, b_0, aad, s_0, b, b);
++
++ /* Process payload blocks */
++ pos = data;
++ cpos = data;
++ for (j = 1; j <= num_blocks; j++) {
++ int blen = (j == num_blocks && last_len) ?
++ last_len : AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++
++ /* Authentication followed by encryption */
++ for (i = 0; i < blen; i++)
++ b[i] ^= pos[i];
++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, b);
++
++ b_0[14] = (j >> 8) & 0xff;
++ b_0[15] = j & 0xff;
++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, e, b_0);
++ for (i = 0; i < blen; i++)
++ *cpos++ = *pos++ ^ e[i];
++ }
+
+- crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
++ for (i = 0; i < mic_len; i++)
++ mic[i] = b[i] ^ s_0[i];
+ }
+
+-int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
++int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
+ size_t mic_len)
+ {
+- struct scatterlist sg[3];
+- char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) +
+- crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)]
+- __aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request));
+- struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *) aead_req_data;
+-
+- if (data_len == 0)
+- return -EINVAL;
+-
+- memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data));
+-
+- sg_init_table(sg, 3);
+- sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad));
+- sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len);
+- sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, mic_len);
+-
+- aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm);
+- aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, data_len + mic_len, b_0);
+- aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length);
++ int i, j, last_len, num_blocks;
++ u8 *pos, *cpos;
++ u8 a[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++ u8 b[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++ u8 s_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
++
++ num_blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(data_len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++ last_len = data_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++ aes_ccm_prepare(tfm, b_0, aad, s_0, a, b);
++
++ /* Process payload blocks */
++ cpos = data;
++ pos = data;
++ for (j = 1; j <= num_blocks; j++) {
++ int blen = (j == num_blocks && last_len) ?
++ last_len : AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
++
++ /* Decryption followed by authentication */
++ b_0[14] = (j >> 8) & 0xff;
++ b_0[15] = j & 0xff;
++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, b, b_0);
++ for (i = 0; i < blen; i++) {
++ *pos = *cpos++ ^ b[i];
++ a[i] ^= *pos++;
++ }
++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, a, a);
++ }
++
++ for (i = 0; i < mic_len; i++) {
++ if ((mic[i] ^ s_0[i]) != a[i])
++ return -1;
++ }
+
+- return crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+-struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
+- size_t key_len,
+- size_t mic_len)
++struct crypto_cipher *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
++ size_t key_len,
++ size_t mic_len)
+ {
+- struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+- int err;
++ struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
+
+- tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("ccm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+- if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+- return tfm;
+-
+- err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, key_len);
+- if (err)
+- goto free_aead;
+- err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, mic_len);
+- if (err)
+- goto free_aead;
++ tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
++ if (!IS_ERR(tfm))
++ crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, key_len);
+
+ return tfm;
+-
+-free_aead:
+- crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+- return ERR_PTR(err);
+ }
+
+-void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
++
++void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_cipher *tfm)
+ {
+- crypto_free_aead(tfm);
++ crypto_free_cipher(tfm);
+ }
+--- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
++++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h
+@@ -12,15 +12,15 @@
+
+ #include <linux/crypto.h>
+
+-struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
+- size_t key_len,
+- size_t mic_len);
+-void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
++struct crypto_cipher *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
++ size_t key_len,
++ size_t mic_len);
++void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
+ size_t mic_len);
+-int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
++int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic,
+ size_t mic_len);
+-void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm);
++void ieee80211_aes_key_free(struct crypto_cipher *tfm);
+
+ #endif /* AES_CCM_H */
+--- a/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h
++++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h
+@@ -11,12 +11,28 @@
+
+ #include <linux/crypto.h>
+
+-void ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
+- u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic);
+-int ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
+- u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic);
+-struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[],
+- size_t key_len);
+-void ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm);
++static inline void
++ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
++ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
++{
++}
++
++static inline int
++ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
++ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
++{
++ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++}
++
++static inline struct crypto_aead *
++ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[], size_t key_len)
++{
++ return NULL;
++}
++
++static inline void
++ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
++{
++}
+
+ #endif /* AES_GCM_H */
+--- a/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h
++++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h
+@@ -11,10 +11,22 @@
+
+ #include <linux/crypto.h>
+
+-struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(const u8 key[],
+- size_t key_len);
+-int ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce,
+- const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic);
+-void ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm);
++static inline struct crypto_aead *
++ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(const u8 key[], size_t key_len)
++{
++ return NULL;
++}
++
++static inline int
++ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce,
++ const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
++{
++ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++}
++
++static inline void
++ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
++{
++}
+
+ #endif /* AES_GMAC_H */
+--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
++++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
+@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
+ * Management frames.
+ */
+ u8 rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1][IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
+- struct crypto_aead *tfm;
++ struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
+ u32 replays; /* dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
+ } ccmp;
+ struct {
+--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+@@ -307,7 +307,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct iee
+ }
+
+
+-static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
++static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
++ u16 data_len)
+ {
+ __le16 mask_fc;
+ int a4_included, mgmt;
+@@ -337,14 +338,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s
+ else
+ qos_tid = 0;
+
+- /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
+- * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
+- * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
+- * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
+- * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
+- * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
+- */
+- b_0[0] = 0x1;
++ /* First block, b_0 */
++ b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */
+
+ /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
+ * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
+@@ -352,6 +347,8 @@ static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct s
+ b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
+ memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
+ memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
++ /* l(m) */
++ put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]);
+
+ /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
+ * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
+@@ -463,7 +460,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee8
+ return 0;
+
+ pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
+- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
++ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, len);
+ ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
+ skb_put(skb, mic_len), mic_len);
+
+@@ -534,7 +531,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct iee
+ u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
+- ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
++ ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, data_len);
+
+ if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
+ key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-04-24 06:04:07 +0000