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authorFelix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>2015-04-23 08:01:51 +0000
committerFelix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>2015-04-23 08:01:51 +0000
commiteba659cbbac0bd31889eb7ca58bf9c86f7dd0feb (patch)
tree7ee84caef089d894ad22bb9ac4f36a3aa1cbe9c0
parent7e3272f422526c7161c1bd8ae8755af1b12948bb (diff)
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hostapd: backport fix for CVE-2015-1863, refresh patches
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org> SVN-Revision: 45567
-rw-r--r--package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch37
-rw-r--r--package/network/services/hostapd/patches/120-daemonize_fix.patch4
-rw-r--r--package/network/services/hostapd/patches/370-ap_sta_support.patch2
-rw-r--r--package/network/services/hostapd/patches/410-limit_debug_messages.patch2
-rw-r--r--package/network/services/hostapd/patches/450-scan_wait.patch2
5 files changed, 42 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e408fbe383
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
+ (CVE-2015-1863)
+
+This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
+p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
+was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
+arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
+dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
+heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
+peer discovery purposes.
+
+This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
+behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
+due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
+and potentially arbitrary code execution.
+
+Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
+hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+---
+ src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/src/p2p/p2p.c
++++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c
+@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p,
+ if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0)
+ os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
+ if (msg.ssid &&
++ msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) &&
+ (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN ||
+ os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN)
+ != 0)) {
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/120-daemonize_fix.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/120-daemonize_fix.patch
index 07a146d1a0..032e2072a3 100644
--- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/120-daemonize_fix.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/120-daemonize_fix.patch
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
#ifdef ANDROID
#include <sys/capability.h>
-@@ -155,59 +156,46 @@ int os_gmtime(os_time_t t, struct os_tm
+@@ -155,59 +156,46 @@ int os_gmtime(os_time_t t, struct os_tm
return 0;
}
@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@
-#else /* __APPLE__ */
-#define os_daemon daemon
-#endif /* __APPLE__ */
--
+-
-int os_daemonize(const char *pid_file)
-{
-#if defined(__uClinux__) || defined(__sun__)
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/370-ap_sta_support.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/370-ap_sta_support.patch
index 993caf4149..ea235e6778 100644
--- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/370-ap_sta_support.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/370-ap_sta_support.patch
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@
#include "drivers/driver.h"
#include "wpa_supplicant_i.h"
#include "config.h"
-@@ -277,6 +278,10 @@ static void calculate_update_time(const
+@@ -277,6 +278,10 @@ static void calculate_update_time(const
static void wpa_bss_copy_res(struct wpa_bss *dst, struct wpa_scan_res *src,
struct os_reltime *fetch_time)
{
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/410-limit_debug_messages.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/410-limit_debug_messages.patch
index b56e5e1632..da887321c6 100644
--- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/410-limit_debug_messages.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/410-limit_debug_messages.patch
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@
/**
* wpa_hexdump_ascii_key - conditional hex dump, hide keys
-@@ -144,8 +179,14 @@ void wpa_hexdump_ascii(int level, const
+@@ -144,8 +179,14 @@ void wpa_hexdump_ascii(int level, const
* bytes per line will be shown. This works like wpa_hexdump_ascii(), but by
* default, does not include secret keys (passwords, etc.) in debug output.
*/
diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/450-scan_wait.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/450-scan_wait.patch
index bce4929d9b..87ebd4552f 100644
--- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/450-scan_wait.patch
+++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/450-scan_wait.patch
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
/* Initialize the driver interface */
if (!(b[0] | b[1] | b[2] | b[3] | b[4] | b[5]))
b = NULL;
-@@ -381,8 +393,6 @@ static void hostapd_global_deinit(const
+@@ -381,8 +393,6 @@ static void hostapd_global_deinit(const
#endif /* CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS */
eap_server_unregister_methods();