| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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According to Augmented BNF in the following RFCs
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234#section-3.6
http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec2.html#sec2.1
field-value = *( field-content | LWS )
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.2
field-value = *( field-content / obs-fold )
... the HTTP message header `field-value` is allowed to be empty.
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Updated wsgi to support Python 3.4 byte strings.
Updated test_wsgi to remove py.test warning for TestApp having an
__init__ constructor.
samc$ sudo py.test netlib/test/test_wsgi.py -r w
= test session starts =
platform darwin -- Python 3.4.1, pytest-2.8.2, py-1.4.30, pluggy-0.3.1
rootdir: /Users/samc/src/python/netlib, inifile:
collected 6 items
netlib/test/test_wsgi.py ......
= 6 passed in 0.20 seconds =
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Fixed byte string formatting for hexdump.
= test session starts =
platform darwin -- Python 3.4.1, pytest-2.8.2, py-1.4.30, pluggy-0.3.1
rootdir: /Users/samc/src/python/netlib, inifile:
collected 11 items
netlib/test/test_utils.py ...........
= 11 passed in 0.23 seconds =
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This reverts commit 823718348598efb324298ca29ad4cb7d5097c084.
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Updated utils.py using 2to3-3.4
Updated hexdump to use .format() with .encode() to support python 3.4
Python 3.5 supports .format() on bytes objects, but 3.4 is the current
default on Ubuntu.
samc$ py.test netlib/test/test_utils.py
= test session starts =
platform darwin -- Python 3.4.1, pytest-2.8.2, py-1.4.30, pluggy-0.3.1
rootdir: /Users/samc/src/python/netlib, inifile:
collected 11 items
netlib/test/test_utils.py ...........
= 11 passed in 0.19 seconds =
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This commit fixes netlib's optional (turned off by default)
certificate verification, which previously did not validate the
cert's host name. As it turns out, verifying the connection's host
name on an intercepting proxy is not really straightforward - if
we receive a connection in transparent mode without SNI, we have no
clue which hosts the client intends to connect to. There are two
basic approaches to solve this problem:
1. Exactly mirror the host names presented by the server in the
spoofed certificate presented to the client.
2. Require the client to send the TLS Server Name Indication
extension. While this does not work with older clients,
we can validate the hostname on the proxy.
Approach 1 is problematic in mitmproxy's use case, as we may want
to deliberately divert connections without the client's knowledge.
As a consequence, we opt for approach 2. While mitmproxy does now
require a SNI value to be sent by the client if certificate
verification is turned on, we retain our ability to present
certificates to the client which are accepted with a maximum
likelihood.
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This sould fix mitmproxy/mitmproxy#815
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The DEFAULT construct is very weird,
but with None we apparently break pathod
in some difficult-to-debug ways.
Revisit once we do more here.
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fixes mitmproxy/mitmproxy#772
We must use the ipaddress package here, because that's what cryptography
uses. If we opt for something else, we have nasty namespace conflicts.
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fixes mitmproxy/mitmproxy#753
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