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* fixed test name
* spelling is hard
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* make an ocsp request
* update test, add docs
* make it an OCSPRequestBuilder
* review feedback and more tests
* make it a class
* empty commit to retrigger
* type check
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* Do conditional compiling of Cryptography_setup_ssl_threads
* Check Cryptography_HAS_LOCKING_CALLBACKS before initing static locks
Check if compiling and initing locking callbacks is necessary
PEP8 fix
* Make test_crypto_lock_init more complete
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* remove freebsd11 builder
it's out of date, we can't update it, and it is unreliable
* we don't test against freebsd for now
* what did case sensitivity ever do for me
* don't assert on bsd since we don't test on for now
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* add public_bytes to OCSPRequest
* review feedback
* OCSP request parsing
* change some prose
* add __len__ as a required method
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* Fixed #4380 -- do not assume TLSv1 is available in OpenSSL
Hallelujah! It's starting to become the case that some OpenSSLs are disabling it.
* cover this file as well
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* Refs #4375 -- integrate wycheproof AES CCM tests
* Skip these tests if we don't have CCM support
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* updated tests for upstream wycheproof changes
* Updated AES tests
* oops, flake8
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We already have coverage of the U-label deprecation warnings in
test_x509_ext.py; see TestRFC822Name.test_idna and
TestUniformResourceIdentifier.test_idna_no_port
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The remaining calls to `signer()` and `verifier()` are exercising the
deprecated API intentionally. Let's test that the deprecation warnings
are being raised as expected.
Closes #4311; see also #4314.
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* Refs #3331 -- integrated wycheproof ECDH tests
* flake8 + missing assert
* Handle this error case
* skip on unsupported
* shouldn't need to try here any more
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* add wycheproof gcm tests
* add AEAD test
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* also check iv length for GCM nonce in AEAD
* ugh
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* add chacha20poly1305 wycheproof tests
* flake8
* review
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* add wycheproof tests for AES CMAC
* review feedback
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* Refs #3331 -- integrated wycheproof ECDSA tests
* Also handle these key loading errors
* review
* empty commit to trigger jenkins
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* add crl.get_revoked_certificate method
* lexicographic is the best ographic
* rename
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rsa, and keywrap (#4310)
* Refs #3331 -- added initial wycheproof integration, starting with x25519 tests
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I believe this can reasonably be considered backwards compatible since other invalid inputs already lead to InvalidUnwrap, and clients shouldn't be distinguishing between these two conditions, and ValueError wasn't documented anyways.
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* document one shot AEAD length restrictions
* write a test that won't consume infinity ram
continue to raise OverflowError since that's what cffi did.
* this applies to associated_data too
* remove unneeded arg
* review feedback on docs
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* raise valueerror for null x25519 derived keys
OpenSSL errors when it hits this edge case and a null shared key is bad
anyway so let's raise an error
* empty commit
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(#4325)
* we don't actually care about the errstack here, it's an invalid signature
We previously had no cases where we could error without getting errors
on the error stack, but wycheproof contains test cases that can error
without adding anything to the stack. Accordingly, we should clear the
stack but raise InvalidSignature no matter what (rather than
InternalError if we have no error msgs)
* add a test
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Previously we encoded them as UTF-8, but as best I can tell in reality a
BMPString is fixed-width basic multilingual plane big endian encoding.
This is basically UCS-2 (aka original Unicode). However, Python doesn't
support UCS-2 encoding so we need to use utf_16_be. This means you can encode
surrogate code points that are invalid in the context of what a
BMPString is supposed to be, but in reality I strongly suspect the sane
encoding ship has sailed and dozens if not hundreds of implementations
both do this and expect other systems to handle their nonsense.
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Duplicate attributes now raise an error instead of silently discarding
duplicates.
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(#4308)
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* Perform an OPENSSL_cleanup before checking the heap in our memleak tests
* Make this binding conditional
* typo
* need to put this call before we reset the function ptrs
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* Add clearer message in Cipher when key is not bytes
* Change location of key type check to verify_key_size function
* Replace formated error message with static
* Add key type check tests to all ciphers constructors
* Change key type error message to lowercase
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* Future proofing use of the six python version constants
After reading [1], noticed that cryptography uses a lot of if six.PY3
blocks. The issue with this is that whenever Python 4 is released,
this code in the else block will be executed even though it was
only intended for Python 2.
[1] http://astrofrog.github.io/blog/2016/01/12/stop-writing-python-4-incompatible-code/
Signed-off-by: Eric Brown <browne@vmware.com>
* Use not PY2 instead
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* Validate the public/private halves of EC keys on import.
OpenSSL's API is a little finicky. If one sets the public key before the
private key, it does not validate that they match. If set in the other
order, it does validate this.
In particular, KASValidityTest_ECCStaticUnified_NOKC_ZZOnly_init.fax
describes error code 7 as:
Result = F (7 - IUT's Static private key d changed-prikey validity)
Reordering the two operations makes those tests to fail on key import,
which is what CAVP appears to have intended.
* Wrap to 79 rather than 80 columns
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* Add API for retrieving the seconds-to-expiry for the token, given a TTL.
* Process PR feedback:
* Do compute the TTL, but just the age of the token. The caller
can decided what to do next.
* Factored out the HMAC signature verification to a separate function.
* Fixed a copy&paste mistake in the test cases
* Tests cleanup.
* `struct` no longer needed
* Document `def age()`
* typo in `age()` documentation
* token, not data
* remove test for TTL expiry that is already covered by the parameterized `test_invalid()`.
* let's call this extract_timestamp and just return timestamp
* review comments
* it's UNIX I know this
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* Raise a ValueError when conversion to generalizedtime fails
* added test for badasn1time value error
* pep8 compliance
* Addressing code review
+ VE now raises with ```{!r}``` formatting
+ Test now checks that the bad string made it into the VE message
* using ValueError.match
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* fix bug with n % 8 length wrapping on AESKWP
* review feedback
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This breaks the urllib3 tests, as well as several in-the-wild certs
This reverts commit 388d1bd3e9cd953fcc948edbc152d5d140c87eb8.
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* implement AES KW with padding (RFC 5649)
fixes #3791
* oops, 2.2
* make sure this is the right valueerror
* more match
* make key padding easier to read
* review feedback
* review feedback
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